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Casino gaming, like any other exchange activity, is in the midst of
a conflict among ideas that shapes the extent to which casino owners
can design, market, and profit from their personal choices, free from
any interference' from external voices that represent the various con-
stituencies in the community who are affected by those choices. Our
very representation of who we see ourselves to be either strengthens
or weakens the arguments for casino gaming as just an ordinary set of
transactions between willing sellers and equally willing, maybe even
eager, buyers. If we view the self as solitary and atomistic, it follows
that markets provide the superior process to effectuate the freedom
and personal responsibility consistent with that view of the person.
However, other views of the self as embodied or interwoven 2 sug-
gest a more communitarian approach to the provision of any good or
service. Market transactions that focus on the benefit-cost calcula-
tions of prospective buyers and sellers are seen from this perspective
as disappointingly narrow. Many people affected by whether a partic-
ular exchange occurs are ignored because the eventual price, output,
and product quality decisions are presumed to be a private affair. The
communitarian self, once it is accepted as descriptive, points to the
market as an ethical step-child for some purposes, but antagonistic to
ethics with respect to the buying and selling of other phenomena.3
Debates about public policy, however, rarely focus on ethical argu-
ments. The prevalence of Enlightenment thinking in contemporary
discourse all too often relegates ethical reasoning to the realm of the
irrational. Economic arguments, on the other hand, are seen as calcu-
lating and definitive. As a result, those who advocate and resist addi-
tional regulation of gaming tend to word their claims in the rhetoric of
commercial activity. Job creation, externalities, 4 and local economic
1. See generally David George, The Rhetoric of Economic Texts, 24 J. ECON. IsSUES
861 (1990) (discussing how the very use of the term "interference" suggests the
legitimacy of untrammeled market freedom, thereby causing political and judi-
cial voices to be seen as interlopers, disrupting the optimal level and form of
commerce).
2. See AMrrAI ETzIoNI, THE MORAL DnViNSION 8-9 (1988), for a discussion of the self
as an agglomeration of"meness" and "weness" by which he means an egoistic and
a caring component.
3. See ROBERT KurrNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTuEs AND LiMrTs OF MAR-
KETS 68-109 (1997), for a discussion of the dangers of extending market logic into
domains where the social impacts of the resulting exchanges would be damaging
to our metapreferences.
4. As we will see later in the paper, even arguments about the addictive quality of
casino gambling or allegations of increased crime activity tend to be phrased as
"externalities," the economics term for impacts that spread out into the commu-
nity, far beyond the effects on the primary parties to the exchange. More con-
cretely, if I gamble repeatedly and consequently am pressured into antisocial
behavior toward you, my gambling activity, although it may have looked on the
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growth or deprivation constitute the language and thus the bounda-
ries of the discussion.
This paper attempts to argue on behalf of greater attention to the
ethical nature of markets and regulation. The strategy is to demon-
strate the intellectual poverty of the economistic approach5 to regula-
tory discourse, at least as it applies to casino gaming. The excitement
of regulatory forces, who wish to restrict the market activities of casi-
nos, at the recent victories of those wishing greater regulation of the
tobacco industry are shown to be inappropriately extended to casino
gaming. To make this point, we demonstrate that casino gaming is no
more a justifiable regulatory target on economic grounds than would
be shopping, an activity whose market legitimacy is taken for granted.
II. PUBLIC POLICY AND CASINO GAMING
If we were to create a list of words that describe gaming, we would
surely include excitement, anticipation, entertainment, and chance.
However, some would argue that we should add the following words to
our list: moral hazard, crime, waste, and detrimental. Controversy
surrounding gaming has existed for hundreds of years.6 In the early
1960s gambling was illegal in all but a few states. 7 Today, three de-
cades later, however, some form of gambling is legal in most states;
surface as just a personal decision between my friendly casino and me, can be
said to have produced an externality. Whether such a result triggers regulation
is discussed in terms of the comparative monetary impact of the regulation and
the lack thereof. That such impacts can be discussed in terms of their enhance-
ment and harm to particular value commitments should be readily apparent.
But the resulting moral discourse is apparently much more jarring to our ears.
5. See J. Kevin Quinn & M. Nel Browne, Economism, Pragmatism, and Pedagogy,
30 EDUC. PHIL. & THEORY 163 (1998), for an explanation of economism as a gen-
eral phenomenon by which the rhetoric of economics is applied to anything and
everything, including schools, friendship, and body organs.
6. See WILLIAm N. THO!iPSON, LEGALIZED GAMBLING 63-73 (1994). In 1835, "[a] vigi-
lante committee [of gambling opponents] torch[ed] the gambling dens of Vicks-
burg, Mississippi and lynch[ed] five gamblers." Id. at 65; see also NATIONAL INST.
L. ENFORCEMENT & CRmi. JUST., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776-1976, at xxiii (1977). The reasons for early criminaliza-
tion of gambling were diverse. One statute in 1541 sought to restrict gambling to
promote the arts of war. See id. at 6-7. Then in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, statutes restricted collection of gambling debts and cheat-
ing at cards in an effort to protect the landed gentry. See id. at 13-16. In early
New England, gambling was restricted to curtail idleness. See id. at 39-41. The
authors note that "[tihe early colonists opposed any unproductive use of time,"
and game-playing was lumped with "dancing, singing, and ... unnecessary walk-
ing on Sundays." Id. at 41-42. However, later statutes in Massachusetts, New
York, and New Jersey in the early eighteenth century focused on other problems
such as "the welfare of innocent families, public safety, and juvenile delin-
quency." Id. at 46.
7. See Mike Roberts, The National Gambling Debate: Two Defining Issues, 18 WHIT-
TIER L. REv. 579, 586 (1997).
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only Hawaii and Utah continue to outlaw all types of gaming.8 Casino
gambling, in particular, has expanded from Las Vegas and Atlantic
City to riverboats in the Midwest and Indian reservations throughout
the country. 9 Now present in twenty-nine states, casino profits and
attendance continue to climb.1o
Gamblingli is now the number one entertainment attraction in the
United States, far surpassing the movie and music industries in prof-
its and cash flows.12 An estimated sixty-one percent of the adult pop-
8. See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and
the Law, 64 Miss. L.J. 291, 303-04 (1995). Hawaii and Utah will likely find the
prohibition of gaming more and more difficult to enforce as the Internet brings
the opportunity to gamble into people's homes. See The Gambling Impact Study
Comm'n, 1995: Hearing on S. 704 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 104th Cong. 73 (1996) [hereinafter Impact Study Hearing] (testimony of
Robert Goodman, Dir., U.S. Gambling Study).
9. See Ranjana G. Madhusudhan, Betting on Casino Revenues: Lessons from State
Experiences, 49 NATL. TAX. J. 401, 402 (1996) (noting that as of 1996, the six
states that have river boat gambling are Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi and Missouri); see also Frontline: Gambling Facts and Stats (visited Jan.
17, 1998) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gamble/etelfacts.
html> [hereinafter Frontline Facts] (on file with the University of Nebraska Col-
lege of Law Library) ("The fastest growing industry in the world is Indian gam-
bling. There are 150 Indian casinos in the U.S. as of May 1997 .... Indian
gaming is a $27 billion a year business in the U.S.").
10. See United States Gaming at a Glance, 18 INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus, Sept.
1997, at 19, 19 (surveying the types of gaming in each state: 16 states allow some
form of casino gambling, and casinos located within American Indian jurisdic-
tions are now in 24 states); Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, (visited
Feb. 7, 1998) <http://www.lasvegas24hours.com/general/genexsuml297.html>
(on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library) (noting a 2.9%
increase in visitor volume and a 10.6% increase in the "economic impact" of
conventions).
11. See I. NELSON RosE, GAMBLING & THE LAw 75 (1986). Nelson distinguishes be-
tween gambling, gaming, lotteries and wagers. See id. In the common law, gam-
bling is identified by the presence of three factors: "1) a person pays [to another
person] something ofvalue... called consideration; 2) the outcome is determined
at least in part by chance; and 3) the winnings are something of value." Id. In
contrast, gaming is one form of gambling where the player must stake something
to play an actual game against other players or the house. See id. at 76. Betting(
wagering, as defined by Nelson, is the promise to give something of value upon
determination of an uncertain event, whether or not skill is involved, and which
involves forms of gambling that are not lotteries or gaming. See id. Nelson states
that while such differences seem to be minuscule, the distinctions are significant
under the law. See id. Notice, however, that if the courts were to interpret the
definition of gambling literally, activities such as investing in the stock market
and taking over another business would be illegal under common law. For sim-
plicity, we use gaming and gambling interchangeably, as is convention.
12. See THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 41; see also Shannon L. Bybee, Jr., Social, Eco-
nomic, and Technological Trends Shaping The Future Of Gaming, SC91 ALI-
ABA COURSE MATERIALS June 25, 1998, at 479 ("In 1993, Casino Gaming Was
The Beneficiary Of 3.6% Of Recreation Spending or .32% Of Personal Consump-
tion Expenditures.").
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ulation participates in some form of gambling each year.13 The
renewed prevalence of casino gambling in the past few decades is a
result of a greater acceptance of the activity by the public14 and an
interest by policy makers who liken it to a pain-free tax.15 Despite its
popularity and burgeoning public acceptance, regulatory efforts to re-
strain the industry's growth remain zealous.
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission is the most re-
cent example of such regulatory efforts. The purpose of the commis-
sion, established by Congress in 1996, is to examine the economic and
societal impacts of gambling. 16 The commission had three years to
prepare a comprehensive and unbiased reportl 7 and is scheduled to
13. See RoSE, supra note 11, at 169.
14. See Harrah's Survey of Casino Entertainment (visited Feb. 9, 1999) <http'//www.
harrahs.comlsurvey/ce97/ce97 acceptance.html> (on file with the University of
Nebraska College of Law Library) (noting 92% of those surveyed feel that casino
gaming is acceptable); Roberts, supra note 7, at 586; Michigan Gaming Law (vis-
ited Feb. 7, 1998) <http-J/www.michigangaming.com/overview.html> (on file with
the NEBRASKA LAw REviEw) (discussing how Michigan's public acceptance of
gaming reflects the national trend).
15. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 586; see also Frontline: Easy Money (PBS television
broadcast, June 10, 1997) (transcript on file with University of Nebraska College
of Law Library) (quoting University of Nevada, Las Vegas Professor William
Thompson: 'There are phenomenal profits, phenomenal profits to be made. So
there is a business incentive that is driving the spread of gaming. Also, politi-
cians are greedy for what they consider to be free money. They consider gambling
tax like money falling off of trees."). But see John Warren Kindt, Legalized Gam-
bling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 ARm L. REv. 889, 891 (1995) (ar-
guing that the "inherent characteristics of legalized gambling activities almost
invariably create pressures for tax increases" due in part to increased social ser-
vice needs).
16. See National Gambling Impact and Policy Commission Act: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 5-6 (1995) [hereinafter Judiciary
Hearing]. Frank R. Wolf, a Representative from the State of Virginia, testified:
The legislation is simple. It would charge the Commission to make an
objective and comprehensive legal and factual assessment of gambling.
This legislation does not outlaw gambling. It does not tax gambling.
It does not regulate gambling. It merely recognizes that gambling is
spreading throughout the country like wildfire... and it needs a hard
look. This is our responsibility as Federal legislators to create a commis-
sion to bring together all the relevant data so that Governors, State leg-
islators and citizens can have the facts they need to make an informed
decision.
Id. at 15.
17. See id. at 6-7. Despite Mr. Wolfs proclaimed objective of providing an unbiased
report, Barbara F. Vucanovich, a representative from the State of Nevada claims:
The authors of this legislation go to great lengths to point out they want
only to have a study to provide States with a much-needed, unbiased
source of information before the voters or the legislature make the deci-
sion to legalize some form of gambling. What strikes me as odd, how-
ever, is the inflammatory statements which accompany this plea ....
Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the real agenda of this effort is a
complete Federal prohibition of gambling.
1999]
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report its findings this summer. While regulation comes in many
forms, the most likely adverse outcome for the industry will be the
imposition of federal taxes.1 s
Advocates of federal regulation argue that legalized gambling cre-
ates moral decay and destroys the lives of gamblers along with the
gambler's families and loved ones. Many opponents cite gambling as a
magnet that attracts corruption' 9 and organized crime and encour-
ages compulsive gambling and its accompanying social woes such as
street crime, domestic violence, and bankruptcy. 20 Additionally,
Id. at 38; see also Bruce Alpert, Gambling Commission Infighting Slows Work,
THE TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Sept. 7, 1997, at A36 (suggesting that the conservative
make-up of the commission's members indicates that the report is not likely to be
unbiased).
18. See Bronwen Maddox, Hard Look at Both Sides of the Coin as U.S. Gambling
Booms, THE TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, at 25. Heretofore, regulation of gambling has
been relegated to the states via their constitutional authority to protect the
health and welfare of their citizenry. See BLAcieS LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (4th ed.
1968). For a brief, concise account on how various states have chosen to regulate
and legislate this activity, see Paul D. Delva, The Promises and Perils of Legal-
ized Gambling for Local Governments: Who Decides How to Stack the Deck?, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 847 (1995). For a more comprehensive, historical compilation, see
FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR. ET AL., GAMBLING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR AMERICAN
CITIES (1978).
19. See Stephanie A. Martz, Note, Legalized Gambling and Public Corruption: Re-
moving the Incentive to Act Corruptly, or, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, 13
J.L. & POL. 453, 463-65 (1997) (arguing that corruption and the legalization of
gambling go hand in hand). Martz warns that:
Legalizing gambling will not eradicate this corruption, but instead will
shift its focus from local law enforcement to state-level legislators and
bureaucrats. Payoffs and gifts normally (although not exclusively)
slipped into the pockets of corrupt police officers will decline, replaced by
campaign contributions and promises of future benefits to licensing offi-
cials and other regulators. Whether legal or illegal, these practices still
serve to undermine the public's faith in its elected officials. The impor-
tant public policy point is that states need to be particularly concerned
about gambling-related corruption because legalizing gambling allies
the government with a seemingly corrupt industry.
Id.
20. See Rychlak, supra note 8, at 292. Rychlak discusses the impact casinos have
had in Mississippi:
On the negative side, personal bankruptcy is up, more Mississippians
are becoming addicted to gambling, and crime is on the upswing. In
some parts of the State the cost of living is on the rise, there are housing
shortages, traffic problems have multiplied, drainage and sewage sys-
tems are strained, and social services are struggling to keep up with a
growing homeless population. All the while the gaming industry is fac-
ing problems relating to over-saturation and is bracing for the impact of
legalized gambling in neighboring states.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Rychlak also notes that "[t]here are at least five impor-
tant non-economic impacts that the state must carefully consider when setting
policy: the impact on people prone to compulsive behavior, the impact on chil-
dren, the impact on poor people, the impact on crime, and the impact on the envi-
ronment." Id. at 333 (citing DAVID WEINSTEIN & LILLIAN DEITCH, THE IMPACT OF
[Vol. 78:37
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many claim that casinos, which account for a large portion of the $550
billion wagered in 1996,21 drain local economies rather than invest in
them. Furthermore, opponents argue that gambling within a commu-
nity causes crime to increase and leads to traffic congestion, results in
skyrocketing of property values, and cannibalizes small businesses.22
These complaints are not exclusive to gaming. Indeed, some
groups use similar arguments to support regulation of a variety of
"questionable" activities, such as smoking. How good are these argu-
ments for regulation? Should we be persuaded by these claims of
moral decay or crime?
Why do we regulate any private market activity at all? This ques-
tion can be answered by a review of market logic, which serves as the
foundation for capitalism. Thus, in the first section of this paper, we
consider the role of market failures in prompting regulatory efforts.
Consequently, we can compare this set of reasons with the reasons
offered for the regulation of gaming. We compare the reasons that
should be used to convince us that gambling should be regulated to the
LEGALIZED GAImILING: THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LoTrTsuEs AND
OFF-TRACK BETTING 8 (1974)). See Frontline: Easy Money, supra note 15, for an
example of more extreme rhetoric and concerns regarding gaming. In this inter-
view, Tom Grey of the National Coalition Against Gaming states:
These guys are predators. I really believe that they've targeted the
poor, they've targeted the elderly, they've targeted our young, all for the -
sake of making money. These are bottom-line guys and i'll tell you, the
more I see of them, the more dangerous they become.
Gambling's a predatory enterprise. It's come from the other side of
the tracks and moved itself and put itself on Main Street.
... They maximize the profit and they do nothing to minimize the
pain because you and I, as citizens, have to take care of the pain.
S.. The snake oil they peddle is economic development, painless reve-
nue source and entertainment. They don't say, "But a lot of you are go-
ing to lose your lives. A lot of you are going to lose your homes." We're
saying it's not good economics, it's not good public policy and it's not good
for the quality of life.
Id.
21. See Madhusudhan, supra note 9, at 401-02 ("Casinos account for the bulk of total
wagering in the United States. For instance, nearly 85% of the total wagered in
1994, or $407 billion, was on all types of casinos, including Indian casinos ....
Since 1991, the number of states with some form of casino gaming has increased
dramatically to 34."); see also Frontline Facts, supra note 9 ("Gambling has be-
come a $40 billion dollar a year industry in the United States.... From 1974 to
1994 - 20 years - the amount of money Americans legally wagered has risen
2,800 percent, from $17 billion to $482 billion"); Frontline: Easy Money, supra
note 15 ("Last year the wagers totaled more than $500 billion dollars, more than
Americans spent on cars and houses combined.").
22. See M. Neil Browne & Nancy K. Kubasek, Should We Encourage Expansion of the




reasons that are used. Then, in the next section, we examine the ar-
guments typically offered in support of regulating gaming.
We extend this examination of reason for regulation by arguing
that typical reasons offered for regulating gambling could also be used
to support the regulation of shopping. We make this analogy to
demonstrate the problematic nature of the typical reasons given for
the regulation of gambling. If gaming adversaries are convinced by
their reasons supporting the regulation of gaming, they should be con-
vinced by the same reasons that consumer consumption should be reg-
ulated. We conclude this paper by reviewing the burden of proof that
must be met to regulate casino gambling.
III. MARKET FAILURE: WHY DOES IT
PROMPT REGULATION?
Society faces the daunting task of answering three questions. How
will resources be allocated? How will resources be distributed? Who
has the power to make these decisions? Society may answer these
questions through two methods: markets or the political process. We
have chosen the market mechanism. Specifically, we look to capital-
ism, the economic system that relies on markets for resolving conflicts
caused by scarcity.
Several assumptions about markets are characteristic of capital-
ism. Most importantly, the market is viewed as perfect, in the sense
that consumers hold the power while the invisible hand guides market
transactions. 23 As long as this perfect market functions, there is no
need for government regulation. We can consequently enjoy the vari-
ety of benefits associated with the market. 24 This is so because con-
sumers, rather than producers or the government, define the quality
and value of products and services. 25 Furthermore, if producers want
to be successful, they must be responsive to consumers. 26
23. Capitalist theory is "premised on the idea that the ultimate beneficiary of the
economic process should be the consumer." M. NEIL BROWNE & JOHN H. HOAG,
UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 81 (1983). The authors further explain
that:
[Pirices represent consumer signals to producers concerning how many
resources should be devoted to production of a particular good or service.
Prices also provide consumers with information concerning the availabil-
ity of resources for production. Consumer sovereignty refers to con-
sumer control over what is produced and the form the production will
take.
Id.
24. See JOHN H. McMANus, M1ARiET-DRIVEN JoURNALISM: LET THE CITIZEN BEWARE?
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However, if market failure occurs, the assumption of a perfect mar-
ket is violated. Consumers no longer have the power assumed in the
perfect market.2 7 Consequently, regulation is needed.
Market failure is present when consumers, as a collective, do not
receive what they desire because the market has not provided the op-
timal solution for them. Several market failures stimulate interven-
tion, including: externalities, 28 asymmetrical information, 29 market
power,3 0 public goods,3 1 and the unfair nature of the initial distribu-
27. See generally ROBERT L. HE IBRONER, BEHID THE VEIL OF ECONOMICS (1988)
(discussing the hidden power dimensions in the market); see also John Kenneth
Galbraith, Power and the Useful Economist, 63 Am. EcoN. REv. (1973).
28. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, What To Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights,
Public Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577 (1995).
Mr. Stone presents the positive and negative externalities as applicable to the
environment and also discusses the idea of the earth as a public good. See id.
Consequently, a gaming antagonist could argue there are negative externalities
that result from participation in gambling activities. See discussion infra Part
VI.B.
29. For a discussion of how preferences are formed as opposed to given, as assumed
by neoclassical economists, compare CAss SuNsTEiN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL
JusTicE 5, 7, 14-16 (1997) (arguing that peoples' decisions are based on whims,
second-order preferences, aspirations, judgments, drives, and roles), with Samuel
Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and
other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75, 104 (claiming that preference
endogeneity gives rise to a kind of market failure), and KUTTNER, supra note 3, at
42-48 (discussing the multi-layered and often irrational preferences of
consumers).
For an example of economic and legal analysis of asymmetrical information as
it is applicable to the Rent-To-Own industry, see Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy
White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. The Rent-To-Own Industry: Reaching A
Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 385 (1997). Martin and Huckins
also implicitly raise the issue of the unfairness of the initial distribution of assets
because the poor are the primary customers of rent-to-own retailers (RTOs).
30. When a firm has the extent of control that allows them to earn economic profits,
they have market power. In other words, when a firm earns anything beyond a
minimal profit, it has market power. See, e.g., Thomas G. Donlan, Editorial Com-
mentary: The Pursuit of Power, BARos, Mar. 9, 1998, at 63 (discussing
Microsoft's battle with the Justice Department concerning allegations made by
Senator Hatch that the software company is, indeed, a monopoly).
Opponents could also claim some states have created oligopolies by granting
only a limited number of gaming licenses, thereby giving the license beneficiaries
excessive market power. See Thomas Easton, The Schumpeter Factor, FoRBEs,
Nov. 20, 1995, at 176, 176 (elaborating on the economic strategy for casinos that
Mississippi has chosen, which is to allow a competitive market: 'The strategy is
in sharp contrast to other states that regulate casinos tighter than nuclear power
plants, making them more like utilities than free-market businesses."). Some cit-
ies, like Detroit, have granted only a limited number of casino licenses, thereby
creating an oligopoly, where the select firms have market power by virtue of their
fewness. See Michigan Gaming Law (visited May 19, 1999) <http://www.michi-
gangaming.com/detarc97.html> (on file with the University of Nebraska College
of Law Library) (discussing the city of Detroit's selection process of the three casi-
nos to be licensed for operation).
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion of assets. In economic thought, any market not purely competi-
tive breeds inefficiencies and inflated prices for consumers. If a state
is going to create this market power, then it should also intervene on
the part of its citizens to ensure the business does not exploit its
patrons.3 2
Consequently, strong reasons to regulate gaming should stem from
market failures. Is this line of reasoning typical from those who wish
to regulate gaming? What arguments are typical from those who wish
to regulate gaming?33 It is valuable to identify and examine the
soundness of arguments used in determining gambling regulations in
order to assure that gaming regulations reflect sound reasoning, re-
specting both public and private interests. As a means to this end, the
next section of this paper will examine the arguments on one side of
the gambling debate: those favoring tight regulation or prohibition of
the casino gaming industry.
IV. COMMON ARGUMENTS USED IN SUPPORT OF THE
REGULATION OF GAMING
This section, organized in five parts, begins by documenting argu-
ments that explore the prevalence and impact of compulsive or prob-
31. See, e.g., Alan Randall, The Problem of Market Failure, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J.
131, 133-34 (1983) (arguing that the concept of nonexclusiveness and nonrivalry
are more concise and understandable substitutes for the concept of a public good).
For a more radical view of what constitutes a public good, see Nancy Folbre, Chil-
dren As Public Goods, 84 AM. ECON. REv., May 1994, at 86; see also SYLvIA ANN
HEWLETT & CORNEL WEST, THE WAR AGAINST PARENTS 93 (1998) ("[society] in-
creasingly expect[s] parents to spend extraordinary amounts of [time], money
and energy on raising their children when it is society at large that reaps the
material rewards. The costs are private; the benefits are increasingly public.").
32. See George Sawyer Springsteen, Note, Government Regulation & Monopoly
Power in the Electric Utility Industry, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 240 (1983).
33. See J. Fred Giertz, High-Stakes Game: Though Gambling Has Grown in Social
and Economic Importance, State Leaders Haven't Found a Rational Policy to Reg-
ulate Legal Gaming, ILLINOIS ISSUES, May 1996, at 33, 33-34. Giertz describes
the various players in the gambling debate and their relative positions:
[Tihe politics of gambling is an exceedingly complex high-stakes game,
fraught with conflicting claims by proponents and foes.
... "[There is little agreement among the parties about the magni-
tude of the costs and benefits of gaming.
... Gambling opponents consist of a mixture of those who oppose
gaming on moral grounds (such as church groups) and those who are
presently benefiting from current gambling activities in the state. The
existing riverboat license holders do not want their protected positions
eroded by the entry of new ventures. Similarly, race track and off-track
betting facilities, which have already been hurt by casinos, do not want
additional competition for the gambling dollar.
[Vol. 78:37
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lem gamblers. Compulsive gaming arguments identify populations at
risk of becoming addicted to gambling as well as exploring the impact
on those who are affected by problem gamblers, including addicts,
family members, and surrounding communities. This discussion of
compulsive gaming will segue into discussions of white collar and
petty crime, followed by arguments that link casino gaming and or-
ganized crime. This section will conclude by documenting the eco-
nomic impact of casino gambling, along with a brief discussion of the
impact of casino gaming on the environment and politics.
A. Populations Affected: The Addict & the Family;
Populations at Risk: Teens and the Elderly
Some of the most heart-wrenching arguments against casino gam-
ing detail the repercussions of compulsive or pathological gambling.34
Suicide, violence, child abuse, and neglect are all said to result from
such addictions.35 Statistics estimating the portion of the population
susceptible to addictive gambling behavior vary significantly and
range from one to eleven percent. 3 6 While the proportion of the popu-
34. See The Nat'l Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Small Bus., 103d Cong. 42 (1995) [hereinafter Small Bus. Hearing]
(prepared statement of Jeffery L. Bloomberg, State Attorney, Lawrence County,
South Dakota). Mir. Bloomberg tells the story of a pizza store manager with no
previous record, who embezzled $45,000 and later committed suicide, and a ser-
geant in the U.S. Air Force "who, prior to gaming, [had] an exemplary ten-year
military career... became hooked on slot machines and eventually murdered a
casino operator in a desperate attempt to retrieve four hundred dollars in bad
checks he had written to the casino." Id. at 47.
35. See Small Bus. Hearing, supra note 34, at 84 (prepared statement of Valerie Lo-
renz, Executive Director, Compulsive Gambling Center, Inc.) ("[C]osts resulting
from compulsive gambling are broken homes, physical and mental health
problems, increase in social and welfare services, indebtedness, bankruptcies,
and crime."); Of Suicides, Pawn Shops and Casinos, TAMPA TRmUuNE, Dec. 20,
1997, at 14 (noting current statistics and studies which indicate the suicide rate
is four times higher in casino towns than towns without casinos); see also Wi,-
LIAm THOMiPSON ET AL., WISCONSIN POLICY RESEARCH INsTITUTE, THE ECONOAIC
hIPACT OF NATIVE AMERIcAN GAING IN WISCONSIN 41-42 (April 1995); E.L. Gri-
nols & J.D. Omorov, Development or Dreamfield Delusions?: Assessing Casino
Gambling's Costs and Benefits, 16 J.L. & Com. 49, 54 (1996) ("Nevada has the
highest suicide rate in the nation according to the 1995 U.S. Statistical Abstract,
more than double the national average. It has among the highest divorce rate
and rate of child death by abuse in recent years and among the highest rate of
accidents per vehicle mile driven. Nevada is also notable in other problem statis-
tics including school dropout rates and crime.").
36. See Martin Koughan, Easy Money, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 1997, at 32, 36
("[Hlaving a casino nearby has been shown in at least one state to increase the
number of people with compulsive gambling problems from about 1 percent of the
general population to 5 percent."); see also Small Bus. Hearing, supra note 34, at
83 (prepared statement of Valerie Lorenz) ("[A]dult gambling addiction has in-
creased from .77% of the adult population.., to as much as 11% in some states in
1993.") (citation omitted); Rychlak, supra note 8, at 338 (comparing industry esti-
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lation addicted to gaming is relatively small, their numbers and im-
pact on society, economically and socially, are quite extensive.3 7
According to Henry Lesieur, President of the Institute on Problem
Gambling, five to six percent of the United States population has a
gambling problem. 3 S The President of the American Gambling Associ-
ation, Frank J. Fahrenkopf Jr., offers a similar statistic, only in much
more favorable guise. He states that ninety-five percent of this coun-
try's population does not have a gambling problem.3 9 So what does it
mean to have a "gambling problem"? Most often it is referred to as
compulsive or pathological gambling. In 1980, the American Psychiat-
ric Association updated its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual to in-
clude gambling as an impulse/control disorder not otherwise
classified.40 According to the Association, pathological gambling is
a chronic and progressive failure to resist impulses to gamble, and
includes gambling behavior that compromises, disrupts, or dam-
ages personal, family, or vocational pursuits.4 1 Pathological gam-
mates of a two to six percent addiction rate to other non-industry estimates as
high as 15% of the population); Loretta Fairchild, Gambling: Who Wins, Who
Loses, Bus. NEB., June 1996, at 1 ("Most spillover costs associated with gambling
come from a small percentage of the population that gambles. Between 30 per-
cent and 50 percent of the population never, or almost never, gambles. Most peo-
ple who gamble can be considered occasional-bettors. The remaining 10 percent
consists of heavy bettors, problem gamblers (2 to 3 percent of the overall popula-
tion), and pathological gamblers (1 to 2.5 percent)"); Small Bus. Hearing, supra
note 34, at 80-81 (prepared statement of John Warren Kindt) (asserting that in-
creases in the number of pathological gamblers accompanies the increase in
availability). In 1989 only 1.7% of Iowa's adults were gambling addicts, but after
riverboat casinos were legalized, the rate of addiction more than tripled to 5.4%.
See RACHAEL A. VOLBERG, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN IOWA: A REPLICA-
TION STUDY 17, 31 (July 28, 1995).
37. See Small Bus. Hearing, supra note 34, at 83-84 (prepared statement of Valerie
Lorenz); see also ROBERT M. POLITZER ET AL., TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDIC-
TION IN MARYLAND, FINAL REPORT 2 ("There are 50,000 pathological gamblers in
Maryland ... [and] another 80,000 problem gamblers in Maryland."); see also
Rychlak, supra note 8, at 340-41 ("The problems associated with compulsive gam-
bling are not limited to the personal downfall of the gambler. 'Economic losses
from work absenteeism, bad debts, and crime [due to gambling problems] have
been estimated at over $34 billion annually to our society.' According to some
reports, every problem gambler negatively impacts between seven and seventeen
other people and costs society approximately $52,000 per year.") (footnote
omitted).
38. See S.C. Gwynne, How Casinos Hook You, Tn, Nov. 17, 1997, at 68, 69.
39. See id.
40. See Richard E. Vatz & Lee S. Weinberg, Refuting the Myths of Compulsive Gam-
bling, USA TODAY, Nov. 1993, at 54, reprinted in GAMBLING 167, 168 (Andrew
Riconda ed., 67 THE REFERENCE SHELF No. 4, 1995).
41. See Henry Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling, Soc'Y, May-June 1992, at 42, re-
printed in GAMBLING 153, 155 (Andrew Riconda ed., 67 THE REFERENCE SHELF
No. 4, 1995). A person is diagnosed as a compulsive gambler if he or she demon-
strates at least four of these ten characteristics:
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bling is possibly the most widely researched behavioral addiction
today.4 2
While addicts are found among many demographic groups, 4 3 teens
and seniors are said to be some of the fastest growing groups of prob-
lem gamblers. Studies exploring the prevalence and impact of com-
pulsive gambling have found that among teens, gambling is
considered one of the fastest growing addictions. 44 For older popula-
tions, this addiction can be particularly difficult, as many seniors are
1) preoccupation with gambling... ; 2) needs to gamble with increasing
amounts of money in order to achieve the desired excitement; 3) is rest-
less or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling; 4) gam-
bles as a way of escaping from problems or relieving ... feelings of
helplessness, guilt, anxiety, depression; 5) often returns another day in
order to get even... after losing; 6) lies to family or others to conceal the
extent of involvement with gambling; 7) engages in illegal acts ... in
order to finance gambling, 8) has jeopardized or lost a significant rela-
tionship, job, educational or career opportunity because of gambling; 9)
relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate situation caused
by gambling... ; 10) repeats unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or
stop gambling.
Id at 155; see also National Council on Problem Gambling, Inc., (visited Jan. 19,
1997) <httpJ/www.ncpgambling.org/> (on file with the University of Nebraska
College of Law Library) ("Pathological, or 'Compulsive' Gambling, [ils a progres-
sive addiction characterized by increasing preoccupation with gambling, a need
to bet more money more frequently, restlessness or irritability when attempting
to stop, 'chasing' losses, and loss of control manifested by continuation of the
gambling behavior in spite of mounting, serious, negative consequences.").
42. See Mark Griffiths, An Exploratory Study of Gambling Cross Addictions, 10 J.
GNAmLING STm. 371, 371 (1994).
43. See Small Bus. Hearing, supra note 34, at 83 (prepared statement of Valerie Lo-
renz) (noting that until the 1970s, compulsive gamblers were primarily white,
middle-aged and middle-class males, but now are composed of more women,
teens, elderly, and persons of various ethnic background and classes).
44. Cf Richard M. Buchta, Gambling Among Adolescents, 34 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS
346 (1995) (indicating that 61% of female adolescents and 83% of male adoles-
cents surveyed reported gambling); see also Darryl Zitzow, Comparative Study of
Problematic Gambling Behaviors Between American Indian and Non-Indian Ado-
lescents Within and Near a Northern Plain Reservation, 7 &1. INDIAN & ALASKA
NATIVE MENTAL HEALTH REs. 14, 14 (1996) (noting that "perhaps due to socio-
economic status, cultural issues, increased direct and vicarious exposure to gam-
bling and gambling availability, that American Indian adolescents displayed
greater frequency of gambling involvements, earlier onset of gambling exper-
iences and greater tendency to exhibit problematic gambling behaviors"); B.A.
Mordecai, Lieutenant Governor's Legislative Council: Let's Promote Gambling,
ids (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http//www.siteone.com/religion/gcc05/g0596009.
htm> (on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library) (referring
to surveys made by the Harvard Medical School Center for Addiction Studies
which showed: 1) that 70 percent of seventh graders in Massachusetts had
bought lottery tickets illegally, and by their senior year, 90 percent had done so;
2) that 64 percent of high school students in Atlantic City had gambled illegally
at local casinos; and 3) that children are twice as likely to become compulsive
gamblers as adults); see also ExEcUTIvE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, CAsINOs IN
FLORIDA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EcoN Iuc AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 78 (1994).
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on a limited income. Consequently, gambling can have a particularly
harsh effect on their living standards.45
Whereas the impact of compulsive gamblers on themselves and so-
ciety is quite negative, the gambling industry may be the one benefac-
tor of this condition. Some estimate that compulsive or problem
gamblers account for twenty-five percent of gaming profits.4 6 It is
likely that this significantly contributes to anti-gambling sentiment,
particularly since the larger community primarily shoulders the costs
of problem gambling. As addicted gamblers search for a means to con-
tinue gambling, costs associated with white collar and petty crime be-
come the burden of the community. Therefore, proponents of
regulation cite the problems within families and communities that
stem from compulsive gambling.
B. Increased Crime Rates
The crime associated with gambling can be categorized into two
types: 1) crime resulting from compulsive gambling behavior involving
white collar crimes, personal property and other related crimes and 2)
the infamous involvement of organized crime in the industry. Nearly
every region that has acquired a casino has experienced an increased
crime rate.4 7 While some attribute this to increased traffic and tour-
45. See Rychlak, supra note 8, at 354 ("At least a quarter of casino patrons are esti-
mated to be retired people. If they gamble away their income, they are left with
no options but to sell their possessions to buy life's necessities.").
46. See Frontline Facts, supra note 9 ("Experts outside the gambling industry esti-
mate that people with gambling addictions account for about 5% of all players -
but 25% of casino and state lottery profits."); see also Fairchild, supra note 36, at
2 (noting a conservative assumption that the most active 10% of bettors in the
population account for 65% of revenues); Grinols & Omorov, supra note 35, at 60
(noting that 52% of casino revenues come from the 4.11% of the population who
are pathological and problem gamblers).
47. See Rychlak, supra note 8, at 331 ("A gas station owner said he has had to make
everyone pay for gas ahead of time because people who lost all their money gam-
bling would try to fill up their tanks for free in order to get home.... He told us
that whereas last year the area had one bank robbery, this year there have been
seven." (quoting New Port Should Be a Blend of Both Old and New, ST. PETERS-
BURG TimEs, May 16, 1994, at A9)); Carl G. Braunlich, Lessons from the Atlantic
City Casino Experience, 34 J. TRAVEL REs., Winter 1996, at 46, 55 ("In 1977,
before the first casino opened, the Atlantic City Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) ranked 50th among the nation's 257 MSAs in per capita violent and prop-
erty crimes. In 1981 the Atlantic City MSA was ranked first."); Priscilla Painton,
Boardwalk of Broken Dreams, TImE, Sept. 25, 1997, at 64 (noting that the crime
rate in Atlantic City has increased to first in the state); see also Maryland Attor-
ney General Curran's Executive Summary on Casino Gambling (visited March 1,
1999) <http://cecilmagazine.com/features/curran.htm> (on file with the Univer-
sity of Nebraska College of Law Library) (noting the crime rate increase in Mis-
sissippi, including fraud, embezzlement, violent youth crimes, and alcohol-
related accidents; Atlantic City; New Orleans; Black Hawk, Co; and Deadwood,
South Dakota); see also Carroll Bogert, Fool's Gold in Black Hawk?, NEWSWEEK,
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ism, others find that explanation insufficient.48 White-collar crime,
such as insurance fraud, cannot be easily explained by increased traf-
fic or tourism. This crime results most directly from the compulsive
gambling behavior. Consequently, proponents of regulation suggest
that the existence of crime in areas where gambling occurs is an ade-
quate reason for creating regulations regarding the gaming industry.
Gaming has traditionally been associated with organized crime,4 9
and although measures have been taken to assure the industry is free
from the mob,5 0 such fears linger in the minds of many. The shadow
of organized crime continues and is reinforced with every report of al-
leged mob involvement in the gaming industry.5 1 In spite of attempts
Mar. 28, 1994, at 22, 23. ("Black Hawk expected a higher crime rate, and the
town hired 22 new cops (up from one half-time marshal in the old days). But the
residents weren't prepared for the kinds of crimes they are getting; in addition to
assault and criminal mischief, says police spokeswoman Dixie Lovinger says '[w]e
have an inordinate amount of urinating in public.'"); James Popkin, A Mixed
Blessing for "America's Ethiopia": Big-Time Gaming Helps But Is No Cure-All,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., March 14, 1994, at 52, 56 (noting arrests for drunken
driving were up 500% in Tunica, Mississippi since casinos arrived). Ed Looney,
from The Council on Compulsive Gambling on New Jersey, states that "[t]eenage
girls are forced into prostitution when they can't pay their gambling debt to the
loan sharks. In 1976 Atlantic City had no prostitution problem, today it is a pub-
lic health problem." National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling (visited Jan.
17, 1998) <http'/www.ncag.org/pages/ncalg01.htm> (on file with the University
of Nebraska College of Law Library).
48. See Grinols & Omorov, supra note 35, at 55-56 (noting that the crime statistics
for three of the largest U.S. tourist attractions (Disney World in Orlando Florida,
the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, and Branson, Missouri, a coun-
try and western music tourist attraction) do not account for an increase in crime
rate based simply on tourism and suggesting that the type of visitor or tourist
impacts this data as well).
49. See Statement on Casino Gambling (visited Feb. 7, 1998) <http'J/www.flacath-
conf.orgIBS/C31D3IB5c3d324.htm> [hereinafter Bishops' Statement] (on file with
the University of Nebraska College of Law Library) (containing a letter of opposi-
tion to legalized gambling written by Florida's Catholic Bishops).
50. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 593-94; see also Frontline: Easy Money, supra note
15 ( 'here was a time when casinos could not get bank loans because of their
shady associations, but now the Mob is gone, tough regulation is in place and
loans from institutional investors are pouring in.").
51. See National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, supra note 47, for a signifi-
cant sampling of anecdotal evidence regarding the continued existence of organ-
ized crime in casino gaming. The report quotes James Moody, former chief of the
Organized Crime section of the FBI who states "[gambling itself... is probably
the biggest producer of money for the American la Cosa Nostra [that] there is."
Id. (citing 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 13, 1992)). The coalition
also cites a 1991 report from the Illinois State Police Division of Criminal Inves-
tigation Intelligence Bureau:
The commission's report provides examples of organized crime figures
being involved in legalized gambling. The report refers to the conviction
of three Chicago mob men ... along with the leaders of the Milwaukee




by the casino industry to deflect the correlation between crime and
casinos, 52 the connection remains in the minds of many, strengthen-
ing the idea that the gaming industry needs regulation.5 3
C. Economic Hazards of Casino Gaming
Those supporting and those antagonistic to the industry often
hotly debate the economic impact of casino gambling. Those who pre-
fer tight regulations, or even a ban of gaming, provide evidence of its
negative impact on the national and local economies.5 4 These figures
Another example cited involved two Chicago mob men who.., were
indicted in 1990 by federal authorities in Maryland for money launder-
ing at a commercial bingo parlor....
In 1991, a reputed San Diego mobster and nine other men including
the alleged bosses of the Chicago mob were charged with trying to infil-
trate Indian reservation gambling operations in Northern San Diego
County in order to skim prowl profits and launder illegal money. The
indictment stemmed from a lengthy investigation by the FBI.
Besides involvement in the management and investment areas of ca-
sino gambling, vending businesses have historically been a target for or-
ganized crime and often unscrutinized and unregulated. Obviously
relationships with ancillary and vending services can affect key casino
operations through influencing casino ownership, investment, manage-
ment and finances. By controlling the supply of: alcoholic beverages,
food and nonalcoholic beverages, garbage handlers, vending machines
providers, linen supplies, maintenance service and construction compa-
nies. Casino management can be placed in a compromising position by
organized crime.
Id.; see also Thomas Moore, Regulator Still Vigilant Against Organized Crime,
LAS VEGAS Bus. PRESS, Feb. 17, 1997, at 6 (quoting Bill Bible, chair of the Nevada
Gaming Control Board). In his interview with Thomas Moore, Mr. Bible warns
against relaxing gambling regulations.
Casinos are cash-rich institutions. So the industry requires an extra
degree of diligence to keep organized crime away from them.
I think you can say it's no longer at the core of the industry like it was
years ago. It's probably more on the periphery of the industry involved
in street crimes like loansharking. So those are areas where we need to
increase our diligence.
Id.
52. See JERMY IMARGOLIS, ET AL., AMERICAN GAMING Assoc., CASINOS AND CRIME: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE 68, available at <http'/Avww.americangaming.org/>
(on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library) (concluding that
casinos have no meaningful impact on crime rates and evidence that indicates
otherwise results from statistical alterations and anecdotal research).
53. But see Roberts, supra note 7, at 593 ("There appears to be no recent proof that
organized crime, presumably existing in the form of large hotels and other pub-
licly traded corporations, still infests the legal gaming business."). Roberts also
proffers state control and federal government reporting and auditing require-
ments to prevent and deter any resurgence of organized crime. See id. at 594.
54. John Warren Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The
Business/Economic Impact of the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 567, 575-76 ("[W]idespread legalized gambling activities are ...
theoretically crippling the national economy .... [and] are inherently recession-
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often include social costs associated with gaming, which include vari-
ous expenses resulting from compulsive gambling behavior such as
bankruptcy, petty crime, and family violence and unrest.55 For exam-
ple, Grinols and Omorov, who argue that gambling is a public policy
issue and a regulatory matter because gambling addiction leads to di-
rect costs on others,56 estimate the social costs of pathological gam-
blers range between $15,000 and $33,500 per addict, or between $112
and $338 per adult each year.5 7
The costs extended to the community are not limited to social costs
associated with problem gambling. Some argue, for example, that the
negative economic impact of casinos includes increased cost-of-living
expenses, housing expenses, and potentially devastating competition
for local business vying for discretionary dollars.5 8
Even without the inclusion of social costs when calculating gam-
bling's economic impact, some argue that gambling does not generate
significant economic expansion in most communities and, at times,
negatively affects local economies. US News and World Report, for ex-
ary in nature.... [because of] modest increases in infrastructure costs, relatively
high increases in regulatory costs, large costs to the criminal justice system, and
social welfare .... These business/economic costs can easily translate into reces-
sionary pressures . . . .") (footnotes omitted); see also Grinols & Omorov, supra
note 35, at 58 (describing the economic impact of casino gaming specifically
among Minnesota gamblers seeking help for gambling problems). Grinols and
Omorov note, for example, that 66% of those surveyed attributed their problems
to casinos, compared to only 5% who attributed their gambling problems to the
lottery. Id.
55. See Grinols & Omorov, supra note 35, at 49 ("The social costs of expanded casino
gambling... are between $112-$338 annually per adult.... Producer, consumer,
and tax benefits are no greater than $56. Based on available data, therefore,
casino gambling fails a cost-benefit test."); see also POI=TZER r AL., supra note 37,
at 2 ("Pathological gamblers cost Maryland and its citizens about $1.5 billion an-
nually in lost work productivity and embezzled, stolen or otherwise abused dol-
lars"); Kindt, supra note 15, at 898 ("[Flor every dollar legalized gambling
activities actually contribute in tax revenues, taxpayers are really losing three
dollars or more.") (footnote omitted). Kindt has also noted that the socio-eco-
nomic costs associated with casinos are so large "that the drains on society could
easily translate into a net loss ofjobs .... " See Small Bus. Hearing, supra note
34, at 81 (footnote omitted); Fairchild, supra note 36 (documenting a study which
estimated the social costs of compulsive gambling to range between $15,000 and
$33,500 for each pathological gambler, for a U.S. total that exceeds $40 billion).
56. See Grinols & Omorov, supra note 35, at 51.
57. See id. at 56-57.
58. See id. at 64. The authors note that:
[Glambling is really a bundling of activities that includes a restaurant
meal, entertainment, and a night out, as well as the gambling activity
itself. Many of those who occasionally gamble, such as retired individu-
als, report that they do so because of the cheap food and drinks. The
bundled activities compete with an abundant supply of close substitutes
including restaurants, movies, concerts, sports events, excursion rides,
the lottery and horse racing.
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ample, analyzed fifty-five counties where casinos were established and
found the economic growth that resulted was comparable to the rest of
the nation.5 9 A similar phenomenon has been documented in relation
to employment: studies outside the industry have found there to be
little or no net increase in jobs.60 More significant may be the argu-
ments that suggest the addition of gambling to a community merely
funnels money into a black hole, actually draining local revenues and
businesses.61 This may result, in part, from an analysis of the source
of gambling revenues. When local discretionary dollars account for a
large portion of the money wagered, rather than tourist dollars, there
is likely to be a reverberating impact on the local community. 62
59. See Joseph P. Shapiro et al., America's Gambling Fever, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 52, 56.
60. See Grinols & Omorov, supra note 35, at 76. After analyzing the effects of casinos
on employment and unemployment by looking at data for 8 casino markets in
Illinois, the authors note that in principle casinos had the potential, to reduce
unemployment, increase employment, or both, but in practice had little or no ef-
fect, except in one or two cases. See id.
61. See Koughan, supra note 36. Koughan opines that:
[Gambling is] a black hole that eats money without returning a socially
useful product to the community. Take Joliet, Illinois, home to riverboat
gambling since 1992. Unlike Las Vegas, where the vast majority of the
gambling take comes from out-of-staters, in Joliet, 82 percent comes
from the locals-who can then no longer spend that money in the area
stores buying clothes or furniture or groceries.
Id. at 36; see also Rychlak, supra note 8, at 331. Rychlak questions whether lo-
cals benefit from casinos at all:
The [owners of the] casinos have not helped the local people very much.
The owner of the motel where we stayed said that he could not get any-
one to work for him because the casinos and big national hotel chains
paid such high wages that older, small motels were being forced out of
business. A gas station owner... sells almost no groceries or soft drinks
because in the casinos, they are free.... The casinos are ruining local
businesses ....
Higher prices [push] people out of the housing market.... [Tihe
number of people in homeless shelters has grown, and Biloxi's soup
kitchens are turning out more meals than ever before.
To a certain extent, these negative economic impacts are nothing
more than natural market adjustments to the birth of a new and vigor-
ous industry in the state. It is now harder to hire people to build homes
in the state, but one can hardly complain about full employment in the
construction industry. Similarly, it is hard to feel bad about casinos hir-
ing people at good salaries and thereby driving up the cost of labor for
other employers. If rental prices are artificially high in some areas today
construction will eventually meet the demand and prices will come back
down. If certain industries are now less profitable, that is just a reflec-
tion of the market at work. These adjustments are simple economic
growing pains, inconvenient and undesirable to those who are directly
impacted, but not a valid basis for challenging the gaming industry. So-
cial issues, however, are an altogether different matter.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
62. See Fairchild, supra note 36, at 4-5. Fairchild cites the major reasons that casi-
nos generate few local jobs:
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Some argue against casinos based on the disproportionate impact
they impose upon those with a lower socioeconomic status. Although
existing evidence indicates that while lower-income people do not, in
absolute amounts, spend more than middle-income people do on gam-
ing, they do spend a higher percentage of the income.6 3
Other economic arguments against gaming are motivated by con-
cerns of market saturation and its effects on local governments and
communities. 64 Casinos have generated significant tax revenue upon
which some states have become dependent to meet basic budgetary
requirements. 6 5 As access to casinos increases with casino growth,
the resulting market saturation can cause a decrease in casino profit
and tax revenue, making casino tax revenues an unstable source of
revenue. 6 6 Moreover, some fear that states will become desperate for
revenue and may relax gaming regulations in order to expand the
gaming industry whose success increasingly depends on cannibalizing
dollars from other businesses and whose expansion will create serious
future problems for other businesses and governments. 67 Thus, gov-
ernments are at risk of motivation due to budgetary requirements
rather than social or public benefit.6s
Riverboat-type casinos typically cater to local markets. Providing
gambling to local residents simply transfers money from one local busi-
ness to another and does not lead to a net increase in jobs.
Casino revenues must be spent locally to have an effect on the local
economy. Casinos that obtain large flows of revenues from regional and
national markets but remove equally large flows do not enhance the local
economy.
Even when casinos spend locally, as is usually the case with payroll
expenditures, it is possible that many employees may reside outside the
local areas, hence, this spending is lost to the local economy.
Workers hired may have come to the labor market from outside the
area so casino jobs, while geographically local, are not necessarily held
by locals who were residents before casino introduction.
iivate interests would find casinos profitable, but the public interest
is best served by having none at all.
Id.
63. See Madhusudan, supra note 9, at 408.
64. See Rychlak, supra note 8, at 323; see also Return of the Small Caps, CASINO J.
(visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.casinocenter.com/journal/dec97/html/
small_caps.html> (on fie with the University of Nebraska College of Law Li-
brary) (discussing the impact of saturation concerns on the market).
65. See Giertz, supra note 33, at 33.
66. See Rychlak, supra note 8, at 323-25.
67. See Small Bus. Hearing, supra note 34, at 63 (prepared statement of Robert
Goodman, Dir., U.S. Gambling Study).
68. See Kindt, supra note 54, at 578. Kindt sees a growing dependency on gambling
revenues:
A major result of market saturation has been a tendency towards more
lax government gambling regulation and public subsidies to help com-
peting private gambling operations survive.... [S]tate and local govern-
ments have been enticed by the initial tax revenues without considering
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Many of these economic arguments against casino gaming note the
Beggar-Thy-Neighbor politics and the Prisoner's Dilemma problems
associated with the establishment of casinos in a community. 69 States
must compete with each other to hold onto available discretionary dol-
lars, as do localities within states. 70
Identifying and weighing the costs against the benefits becomes
quite complicated when many of the figures are unquantifiable and
the ideas abstract, yet larger economic issues are at stake, according
to Goodman and Kindt. Goodman suggests the increasing cash flow
that funnels into the gambling industry impacts upon the financial
well-being of the country as funds are diverted from savings and in-
vestments. 71 Kindt, however, frames this issue in more urgent terms,
claiming our economic health and national security are at stake if wa-
gers continue at current rates. 72 Ultimately, most would agree on the
importance of considering economic and social costs in order to logi-
cally and effectively implement a policy regarding gaming.73
D. Environmental Costs of Casinos: Concern for the
Environment
Casinos have a vast impact on the environment, just as they do on
the economy. Concerns arise in regard to casinos' impact on wetlands,
the social and economic consequences. Funding specific state programs
with gambling revenues has tended to make them gambling-dependent.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Rychlak, supra note 8, for a discussion of the
necessity of monitoring gambling revenues:
The decision to let the free market fix the number of casinos in Missis-
sippi seems reasonable on its face. States do not usually limit other in-
dustries; competition will do that. However, the profitability of the early
casinos will continue to lure more casinos into the state. With the dra-
matic impact that these casinos have had in given areas, there will be
significant displacements as old ones close and new ones open. In addi-
tion, due to the regulatory scheme, it may be necessary to ultimately
limit the number of casinos in order to maintain proper supervision. If
the displacement issue becomes more serious, and especially as the in-
dustry begins to face competition from other states, look for pressure on
the legislature to statutorily limit the number of casinos in Mississippi,
as is done in most other states. There may be valid reasons to establish
such a rule, but economic theory would suggest that consumers - pa-
trons of the casinos - are best served by the wide open competition that
now exists in Mississippi. This is an issue which needs to be monitored
as the Mississippi gaming industry matures.
Id. at 325-26 (footnotes omitted).
69. See Grinols & Omorov, supra note 35, at 67.
70. See Impact Study Hearing, supra note 8, at 72 (testimony of Robert Goodman,
Dir., U.S. Gambling Study) (noting the increasingly intense competition among
states to attract each other's gambling dollars across state lines).
71. See id. at 73.
72. See Kindt, supra note 54.
73. See Grinols & Omorov, supra note 35, at 81-82.
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flood planes, and local wilderness. 74 Conservationists argue that the
costs of environmental destruction and degradation be included when
determining the benefits of casinos.75
E. Political Contributions and Lobbying on Behalf of the
Gambling Industry
Gambling opponents also note industry's extensive political contri-
butions and lobbying activities as evidence of the powerful and con-
trolling nature of the enterprise.7 6 The number of lobbyists has grown
from the pool of large casino interests in Vegas to include smaller
riverboat owners and various Indian tribes. Each attempts to limit
gaming in order to secure and protect their clientele from competi-
tion.77 At times, opponents of gambling find themselves working with
other gambling interests in an attempt to keep legal gambling out of
certain jurisdictions. Most troubling may be the gambling industry's
74. See Rychlak, supra note 8, at 331 ("The casinos... are simply swallowing up that
entire beautiful coastline. The beach is going to disappear under casinos.") (foot-
note omitted).
75. See id. at 354 (noting a casino's impact is comparable to that of a small town,
significantly straining the surrounding environment).
76. See Frontline Facts, supra note 9 ("Gambling interests have contributed $4.5 mil-
lion to political parties and candidates at the federal level since 1991." (citing
CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRriY, 1996 REPORT)). The Frontline report notes that
the money spent on federal lobbying is dwarfed by the amount spent at the state-
level, as most of the laws regulating gambling are state laws. See Frontline: Easy
Money, supra note 15; see also Koughan, supra note 61, at 35. Koughan reports
that:
A 1996 study by the Center for Public Integrity found that between 1991
and 1995, gambling contributions to federal politicians and soft money
accounts amounted to $4.5 million. And gambling contributions are
growing dramatically. The industry ponied up nearly $5 million for the
1996 election alone, a sum evenly distributed between Democrats and
Republicans. But gambling money going to federal elections is only a
small part of the story.... I]he individual states (rather than the fed-
eral government) [primarily regulate gambling] and that is where the
industry has handed out the bulk of its influence money. A Mother
Jones investigation has found that over the past five years the gambling
industry has spent more than $100 million in political contributions and
lobbying fees to influence state governments.
Id. Koughan has also found that:
Every move to regulate California gambling has been shadowed by an
army of industry lobbyists. In just five years, gambling interests spent
more than $7 million to lobby the regulation bills. The fight has been
going on so long, in fact, that the players keep switching teams. This is
Gene Irbin. Three years ago he was one of the authors of the attorney
general's bill. This year he's a lobbyist for a Las Vegas casino.
Frontline: Easy Money, supra note 15; see also Bishops' Statement, supra note 49.
77. See Frontline: Easy Money, supra note 15 ("Native Americans are newcomers to
the regulation debate. They support limits on gambling elsewhere in the state to
protect the new and hugely profitable monopolies on their sovereign lands.").
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attempt to cover all their bases and buy political influence from both
major political parties.7 8
V. ARGUMENTS OFFERED BY PROPONENTS OF A MARKET
APPROACH TO GAMING
As described in the previous section, in an attempt to argue for the
regulation of gaming, some people cite problems ranging from compul-
sive gambling to deleterious effects on the environment. In discus-
sions about gaming, certain analysts, eager to restrict casino gaming,
have latched onto the social antagonism towards the tobacco industry.
The argument made by these opponents is applicable to any addiction.
The reasoning is that tobacco is now understood as the evil it is. Be-
cause society has finally recognized this, regulation has ensued. Gam-
bling also is evil; mutatis mutandis, it should similarly be regulated.
To the credit of gambling opponents, certainly it is possible to find
commonalties in the social ills associated with these two activities.
Both are potentially addictive and produce negative externalities. 7 9
Likewise, both have moralistic opponents. Additionally, neither activ-
ity meets a clear social need.S0 Furthermore, gambling, like tobacco,
is thought to be more prevalent among the poor.S1 There is one impor-
tant distinction between gambling and tobacco, however, that makes
the analogy deficient, especially for the purposes of arguing for regula-
tion of the gambling industry.
78. See MEREDITY O'BRIEN, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, PLACE YOUR BETS: THE
GAMBLING INDUSTRY AND THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (1996). Steve Wynn,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Mirage Resorts, Inc., helped raise more
than $1 million for presidential candidate Bob Dole and the Republican Party
and also appeared with Bill Clinton at a fund-raising event in Las Vegas that
raised approximately $500,000. Wynn reportedly pledged to raise or contribute a
six-figure amount to the Democratic Party to support Clinton's re-election cam-
paign. See id. at 1-2, 6-7.
79. For a discussion of the negative externalities associated with gambling, see supra
Part III. See also Anita Bartholomew, What You Don't Know About Secondhand
Smoke, READER'S DIGEST, July 1997, at 140, 142 (detailing the especially egre-
gious side effects of secondhand smoke on infants and children, including asthma
and ear infections).
80. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 398 (11th ed. 1980) ("[Gambling] involves
simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating no new
money or goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless ab-
sorb time and resources. When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where
the main purpose after all is to "kill" time, gambling subtracts from the national
income."). The same criticism can be made of other recreational activities such as
movie going and camping. Neither of these activities creates output, other than
the utility (satisfaction) they create for their participants. Yet it is difficult to
imagine someone suggesting these activities serve no purpose in society and
should therefore be banned.
81. See Todd A. Wyett, Note, State Lotteries: Regressive Taxes in Disguise, 44 TAx
LAw. 867 (1991).
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Unlike tobacco consumption, gambling does not cause lethal dis-
eases, nor is there any harmful substance ingested into the body at
the craps table.8 2 Despite efforts by opponents to classify gambling as
a chemical addiction, thus far the theory remains largely unaccepted.
Sirgay Sanger, former president of the National Council on Problem
Gambling, has admitted that "[p]lathological gambling 'has the smell
of a biochemical addiction in it, but .... there is no research proof.'" 8 3
What is also problematic about comparing gambling to tobacco is
that gambling adversaries face the difficulty of proving causality be-
tween gambling and its alleged social ills. Although gambling is be-
lieved to increase the level of crime within the community in which it
operates, the reasons for the increase are not easily explained.8 4 Un-
like gambling, doctors can prove tobacco causes lung and mouth can-
cer through empirical research and analysis. The tar build-up on the
lungs of a smoker is visible. However, it is not as simple to directly
relate gambling to, for example, crime or family and marital distress
because it is uncertain whether these problems would exist even if
gaming opportunities did not. Therefore, claims that an addition to
gambling is similar to a tobacco addiction are, for now, precarious. Ar-
dent opponents of the gaming industry must do more than use weak,
faulty analogies to meet the regulatory burden of proof.
VI. WHY AREN'T WE ARGUING FOR THE SIMILAR
REGULATION OF SHOPPING?
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the arguments asso-
ciated with the regulation of tobacco are not necessarily transferable
as arguments for the regulation of gaming. Still, many people
strongly support the regulation of both tobacco and gaming. In this
section, we examine other behaviors that could be regulated if one ac-
cepts the reasoning typically given by the proponents of gaming regu-
lation. Specifically, we suggest that many of the problems often
associated with shopping are similar to the problems associated with
gaming. Yet, we do not hear arguments supporting the regulation of
shopping. Instead of arguing for the regulation of shopping, many
82. See generally The War Against Smoking: Has It Gone Too Far?, CuRRENT EvENTs,
Sept. 5, 1994, at 2a-2d (specifying reasons for regulating smoking).
83. Vatz & Weinberg, supra note 40, at 169 (reporting on a 1989 study published in
The Archives of General Psychiatry, which "found that 17 heavy gamblers had
neurochemical elevations correlated with their 'extroversion.'"); see also Alec Roy
et al., Extraversion in Pathological Gamblers, 46 ARcHVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 679,
681 (1989). However, Roy's study, is not convincing because it does not compare
the elevations of compulsive gamblers with those of normal gamblers. See id. at
679.
84. See infra Part VI.B.
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critics proffer arguments about the need to "downshift" from the con-
sumer culture.8 5
Consumption is so fundamental to our culture and economy that to
suggest regulation of it based on its similarities to gambling seems to
place the foundation of our society in peril. Nonetheless, in the pages
that follow, shopping will be presented in a light in which many people
have never viewed it. Consequently, upon comprehension of the social
ills and benefits of consumer consumption,8 6 the legitimacy of such a
bizarre analogy should become apparent.
Not surprisingly, shopping has not received the plethora of atten-
tion as an addiction that gambling has. Yet, its recognition as prob-
lematic can be traced back to Emil Kraeplin, who named compulsive
shopping "oniomania," and called it a pathological impulse.8 7 Inci-
dences of the presence of addictive buying date as far back as Mary
Todd Lincoln, who was infamous for spending far beyond even a presi-
dential income.8 8 Yet in spite of Kraeplin's recognition and research,
oniomania has yet to be classified as a formal mental disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association. Nevertheless, numerous scientists
85. See, e.g., JuLIET B. SCHOR, THE OvERsPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOWNSHIFT-
ING, AND THE NEW CONSUMER 22-24, 113-142, 149-152(1998). Schor comments on
modern efforts to eschew consumerism.
The pressures for upscale consumption, and the work schedules that go
along with it, created millions of exhausted, stressed-out people who
started wondering if the cycle of work and spend was really worth it.
And some concluded that it wasn't. So they started downshifting, reduc-
ing their hours of work and, in the process, earning and spending less
money.
Id. at 22. Schor further notes the positive effects of this downshifting.
In contrast to the fashionable ideology that a "free market" is the best
response to society's needs because it allows the freest expression of the
public will, in these examples the self-control of a group of people leads
to a better outcome for everyone. Voluntary restrictions on individual
liberty can make sense.
Id. at 150.
In contrast to Schor's suggestion that people work less, Robert Lane argues
that individuals should stop viewing work as a means for consumption. See ROB-
ERT E. LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 3-5 (1991) (suggesting that work should be
primary because work, not consumption, encourages development-cognitive
complexity, self-efficacy, and happiness).
86. See THE CONSUMER SocIETr (Neva R. Goodwin et al., eds., 1997), for a general
discussion of the problems resulting from the emphasis on consumption in our
society.
87. See, e.g., Gary A. Christenson et al., Compulsive Buying: Descriptive Characteris-
tics and Psychiatric Comorbidity, 55 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 5 (1994) (citing EMIL
KRAEPELIN, PSYCHIATRiE 409 (8th ed. 1915)).
88. See Donald W. Black, Compulsive Buying: A Review, 57 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY,
Supp. 8, at 50 (1996). Black also cites other famous compulsive shoppers such as
Jacqueline Kennedy Onasis and the former First Lady of the Philippines, Imelda
Marcos. See id.
[Vol. 78:37
REGULATION OF CASINO GAMBLING
have recognized its perilous nature and commenced to study its
prevalence.8 9
Currently, compulsive shopping is defined as "chronic, repetitive
purchasing that becomes a primary response to negative events or
feelings."9 0 It is suspected that approximately five to ten percent of
89. See e.g., Christenson et al., supra note 87, at 5. Christenson and his colleagues
"investigated the demographics and phenomenology" of compulsive buying. Id.
The doctors conducted interviews of both compulsive and normal buyers. Their
results indicated that "[the typical compulsive buyer was a 36-year-old female
who had developed compulsive buying at age 17 1/2 and whose buying had re-
sulted in adverse psychosocial consequences." Id. Furthermore, the study found
that "[clompared with normal buyers, compulsive buyers had a higher lifetime
prevalence of anxiety disorders, substance use disorders, and eating disorders
and were more depressed, anxious, and compulsive." Id. The authors concluded
that compulsive buying demonstrates characteristics of both an impulse control
disorder and an obsessive/compulsive disorder. "[Clompulsive buying is a defina-
ble syndrome that causes significant personal, social, and economic disability
.... " Id. at 10. The particular strengths of this study, as compared to others,
are: 1) it compared compulsive to normal buyers, and recruited through a news-
paper ad, which provides for a more random sample than, for example, recruit-
ment through a clinic that already treats compulsive shoppers who have sought
professional help; and 2) the compulsive buyers were matched by sex and age to
normal buyers to eliminate possible characteristic biases. One weakness of the
study that speaks to the professional indifference towards oniomania is that the
study assessed interviewees using the Minnesota Impulsive Disorders Interview
(MIDI). See id. at 6, 10. The authors of this study were forced to use this method
because of the lack of other assessments within the profession. The authors aptly
point out that the MIDI "has not yet been studied in terms of validity and relia-
bility." Id. at 10.
Susan McElroy and other's conducted a study that showed of those patients
studied, 95% had lifetime diagnoses of major mood disorders, 80% had anxiety
disorders, 40% had an impulse control disorder, and 35% also had eating disor-
ders. See Susan L. McElroy et al., Compulsive Buying: A Report of20 Cases, 55 J.
CLnicAL PsYCHIATRY 242, 242 (1994). They studied 20 psychiatric patients diag-
nosed with problematic buying behavior to assess the characteristics of their be-
havior and discover other disorders, which might exist in tangent. These
percentages are compelling. However, because of the biased sampling process,
(patients were recruited through clinician referrals), they may not be representa-
tive of compulsive buyers at large. But see Susan L. McElroy, et al., Treatment of
Compulsive Shopping with Antidepressants: A Report of Three Cases, ANNALs OF
CLINIcAL PsycmARY, Sept. 1991, at 199:
[tihe apparent response of compulsive shopping to ... medications with
documented antidepressant effects... raises the possibility that compul-
sive shopping is related to depression. This speculation is supported by
the fact that all three patients met DSM-m-R criteria for a mood disor-
der, as well as evidence that some of the associated disorders in these
patients (panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and bulimia
nervosa) may, in turn, be related to depression.
Id. at 202-03 (footnote omitted); see also Michel Lejoyeux et al., Study of Compul-
sive Buying in Depressed Patients, 58 J. CLINICAL PsYcHiATRY 169 (1997).
90. Helen S. Kuo, Compulsive Buying Widespread Among College-Age Consumers,
THE BAYLOR LARIAT, Apr. 25, 1996, at 1 11 <http:/www.baylor.edu/-Lariat/
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United States' consumers suffer from oniomania.9 1 Several studies
have been conducted to determine the characteristics and conse-
quences associated with compulsive buying.92 Research, studies, and
successful treatment of oniomania with antidepressants have
prompted psychiatrists to conclude compulsive buying is a definable
clinical syndrome, which can cause its sufferers significant distress.9 3
Unfortunately for our society's future, oniomania is not only pres-
ent in mature adults. Marketers purposefully and diligently breed
spenders, and their efforts are paying off. According to the Interna-
tional Council of Shopping Centers, teens make almost forty percent
more visits to the malls than other shoppers.94 In 1997, teens were
predicted to spend $84 billion. 95 For the past forty-four years, teen
spending has increased every year, despite the occurrence of eight re-
cessions and the decreasing size of this population segment during the
Generation X teen years.96 A report by Interep Research forecasted
teen income to hit $119 billion in 1998 and that spending by this
group will continue to soar.9 7
Also alarming is that young adults are spending more time in
malls than any prior generation. Dr. James Roberts, assistant profes-
sor of marketing at Baylor University, comments that shopping cen-
ters are becoming hangout places where adolescents seek
entertainment and socialization amongst friends.9 8 Female adoles-
cents are estimated to spend eleven hours per weekend at the mall.9 9
From a young age, female children are socialized to find pleasure in
shopping. Cool Shoppin' Barbie,100 plastic shopping carts with little
Archives/1996/19960425/05--dldl.html> (on file with the University of Nebraska
College of Law Library) (quoting Dr. James Roberts).
91. See Jeannine Mjoseth, What Triggers our Penchant for Overzealous Shopping?,
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N MONITOR, Dec. 1997, at 13, 13. But see McElroy et al.,
Compulsive Buying: A Report of20 Cases, supra note 89, at 242 & n.18 (reporting
that the prevalence of compulsive shopping appears to be between 1.1% to 5.9% of
the normal population (citing R.J. ABER & T.C. GUINN, BEYOND PHENOMENOLOGY:
EMERGING THEORETICAL NOTIONS ON COMPuLsVE BUYING, PRESENTATION BEFORE
THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL Assoc. CONFERENCE, 1991) and noting the lack of
research and attention to oniomania, which probably accounts for discrepancies
in the prevalence estimations).
92. See e.g., Christenson et al., supra note 87; McElroy et al., Compulsive Buying: A
Report of 20 Cases, supra note 89.
93. See, e.g., Black, supra note 88, at 54.
94. See Nina Munk, Girl Power!, FORTUNE, Dec. 8, 1997, at 132, 133.
95. See id. (citing a report by Teenage Research Unlimited, a market research firm
based in Northbrook, Illinois).
96. See Matthew Klein, Teen Green, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 1998, at 39 (citing a
Rand Youth Poll report).
97. See id.
98. See Kuo, supra note 90, at 18.
99. See id. at 19.
100. See Barbie Gets Her First Credit Card, CREDIT CARD MANAGEMENT, Jan. 1998, at
6. (discussing the inclusion of the MasterCard brand with a child's toy). Master-
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girls pictured on the packaging, and games with shopping as their
goal abound the toy aisles of stores. The effects of socialization be-
come evident into adulthood. A study of 300 Texas college students
revealed that nineteen percent of those interviewed between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-four were considered compulsive buyers.1 0 1 Of
those nineteen percent, sixty-seven percent were females.1o 2 It seems
inevitable that the incidence of compulsive shopping will continue to
proliferate into the twenty-first century, particularly among
females.1 0 3
A. Social Benefits of Gambling & Shopping: The Promise of
Economic Prosperity
So, why are marketers so ravenously targeting teenagers to buy
their products? Is there any good that comes from excessive spending?
The answer to the later question is "yes", and economists refer to the
concept as "economic development." Simply stated, the term refers to
the creation of jobs and income within a community. According to
Pittman and Culp, a more rigorous definition of economic development
may provide a better assessment of an establishment's value to the
community. "The key for sustained community growth is to bring in
expenditures from outside of the area and not simply redistribute ex-
penditures that are already present in the area."1 0 4 Conceivably, both
Card has stated that, despite the fact the payoff from the Barbie promotion will
be far into the future, it is willing to wait because it believes adults will buy those
brands they were introduced to as children. See id.
101. Kuo, supra note 90, at 3.
102. See id.
103. See Munk, supra note 94, at 134 ("Boys spend money too. But its girls who move
markets."). In Munk's article, Randy Hild, head of Roxy, the female division of
Quicksilver, Inc., states, "[a] guy will buy one, maybe two, [surf] board shorts
each summer .... But a girl goes through four or five pairs a summer .... " Id.
Quicksilver is just one company that has recognized and preyed upon the increas-
ingly large spending patterns of teenage females. See id. Other companies such
as Pacific Sunwear of California, Inc., were lagging in sales until they started
targeting teen girls. See id.
104. Robert H. Pittman & Rhonda P. Culp, When Does Retail Count as Economic De-
velopment?, EcoN. DEv. REv., Spring 1995, at 4, 4. According to the Pittman &
Culp, a "simple litmus test" can determine true economic development.
[An establishment] counts as economic development when it increases
the amount of money available in the community. This occurs when [the
establishment] brings outside expenditures into the community, that is,
when it is a basic economic activity. In addition, . . . establishments
which entice residents to buy locally what they had been buying outside
the community, thereby reducing... leakage and keeping more income
in the community, also counts as economic development.
Id. at 5. The latter criterion is especially applicable to casinos. Policymakers are
pressured to pass legalized gambling legislation when surrounding communities
have already done so; otherwise, their constituents who choose to gamble will
take their money outside of the community. See, e.g., GovERNoR's OFFICE OF
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casinos and malls could create permanent jobs and entice income from
outside the local area. Thus, both types of establishments could be
used as economic development strategies.
Several communities have welcomed malls as a stimulus for eco-
nomic growth. Between the years of 1957 and 1988, shopping centers
in the United States increased in number by over 1325%, from 2000 to
28,500.05 The obvious benefits of malls are the revenues they gener-
ate in the form of sales and property taxes. Additionally, their exist-
ence is likely to attract shoppers from outside the immediate
community and thus malls bring in expenditures from abroad. So far
as they can be deemed a source of economic development, as defined
by Pittman and Culp,i 0 6 it is true that communities benefit financially
from the existence of malls.
Communities' and economists' faith in the money-making and revi-
talizing power of shopping centers is evident in the story of Silver
Springs, Maryland. Since 1988, over 220 businesses have moved out
of this small city, located outside of the nation's capital.107 To combat
this bleak economic downturn, town leaders have proposed a $585 mil-
lion renovation to the city's shopping district in the hope that the
makeover will rejuvenate the local economy.10 8
This strategy was seemingly prosperous for a city in rural Ohio.
The addition of a regional mall located in Beaver Creek, a suburb of
Dayton, has made Green County one of the fastest growing counties in
the State of Ohio.109 Besides the jobs and taxes generated by the mall
PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA AND NEvADA: SuB-
SIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING (1992). The
report notes the tremendous transfer of wealth across state lines:
In the midst of continued (and justified) concern over emigration of
businesses and productive taxpayers out of California, another, long-
standing migration has been overlooked. That is the migration of dol-
lars out of California to the casinos of Nevada.
Gambling by Californians pumps nearly $3.8 billion per year into Ne-
vada, and probably adds about $8.8 billion-and 196,000 jobs-to the
Nevada economy, counting the secondary employment it generates. This
is a direct transfer of income and wealth from California to Nevada every
year.
Id. at ES-5.
105. See Linda Weber, Protect Yourself from Shopping Mall Crime, GOOD HOUSEKEEP-
ING, Mar. 1, 1998, at 191-92.
106. See Pittman & Culp, supra note 104, at 5.
107. See The Mall of Dreams, THE ECONOVST, May 4, 1996, at 23, 23.
108. See id.
109. See Michael Hartnett, Ohio Markets Shine With New Shopping Centers, STORES,
Jan. 1997, at 118, 118 & 120. The 1.2 million square feet mall has five anchor
stores and is equipped with marble floors and skylights. See id. at 118. It is
considered an upscale mall. Vincent Ferrini, Ohio Director for the International
Council on Shopping Centers, believes upscale malls and value malls are the only
two viable opportunities available in the mall industry. See id. at 120.
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itself, over one million square feet of adjacent retail space was occu-
pied by companies such as Wal-Mart, Best Buy and Applebee's in less
than a year after the mall opened in 1993.110
In addition to the aforementioned advantages, an article in Occu-
pational Outlook Quarterly suggests another societal benefit of malls.
Building the human capital of its employees is another way malls can
contribute to their respective communities and to society at large.
Mall management staff cite career opportunity as an aspect they like
about their jobs. Corporate management often pays the education ex-
penses for enterprising mall management staff who take courses rele-
vant to their work.1 11
Supporters of the gambling industry also tout economic gains in
the form of job creation and tax revenue. Revenues generated by lot-
teries helped finance construction expenditures for such prestigious
universities as Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Dartmouth and Columbia in
the nineteenth century.112 Today, forty-eight states and the District
of Columbia allow some form of gambling.113 Only Hawaii and Utah
have resisted the temptation.1 4 These two states are missing out on
a piece of the more than $2 billion state tax revenue pie generated by
the industry in 1995.115 Casino gambling, in particular, has expanded
from Las Vegas and Atlantic City to riverboats in the Midwest and
Indian reservations throughout the country.116 Now present in
twenty-nine states, casino profits and visitations continue to climb.11 7
Similarly, forecasts for the industry suggest it will continue to grow.
In recent years gambling activities have exceeded even liberal ex-
pectations. Nationwide bets increased fourteen percent from 1994 to
1995.118 Job creation within the industry also continues to increase
without precedent. The American Gaming Association estimated that
in 1996, the U.S. gaming industry employed over 1.5 million peo-
110. See id.
111. See Kathleen Green, It's a Mall, Mall, Mall World: Jobs in Shopping Malls, 40
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q. 10, 16 (1996).
112. See Matthew Mariani, Jobs in Legal Gambling: A New Giant of an Old Industry,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q., Fall 1996, at 2, 3.
113. See id. at 2.
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. See Eugene M. Christiansen et al., The Gaming Industry: Current Legal, Regula-
tory, and Social Issues, SC91 ALI-ABA 489, 509 (1998); cf Easton, supra note 30,
at 176-77 (reporting the economic success Mississippi has experienced since le-
galizing casino gambling the Mississippi casino industry employs over 27,000
citizens, pays approximately $180 million a year in taxes, and casino revenues
accounted for about three percent of the state's total economic product in 1995).
116. See supra note 9.
117. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
118. See Maddox, supra note 18.
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ple.1 1 9 Michael Evans, a professor at Northwestern University, esti-
mates that direct employment within the industry should grow 7.5%
percent annually through the year 2005, creating an additional
696,000 jobs.120 Assuming these businesses do not go bankrupt, or if
they do, other establishments take their place, casino gambling is also
a source of economic development.
The recent affinity towards gamblingi 21 has resulted from a
greater acceptance of the activity by the public, 122 political interest by
policy makers who liken it to a pain-free tax,12 3 and American Indian
nations that have discovered a means to pull themselves out of pov-
erty.1 24 However, as a skeptic might suspect, the societal perks of
both gambling and shopping do not come without costs.
B. Social Ills of Gambling & Shopping: Benefits Have
Their Price
When an activity with a large demand is introduced into a commu-
nity or region, it is not uncommon for various adverse economic conse-
quences to emerge as well. Congestion, industrial pollution, and rapid
119. See id. (reporting on a study conducted by Arthur Andersen, which concluded
that casinos directly created almost 300,000 jobs in 1995); ARTHUR ANDERSEN,
AMERICAN GAMING Assoc., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CASINO GAMING IN THE UNITED
STATES 3, 7 (1996) (noting that indirectly, casinos have spawned 400,000 more
jobs).
120. See THE EvANs GROUP, A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GAMING INDUS-
TRY THROUGH 2005, at 1-1 (1996); see also Mariani, supra note 112, at 9 (detailing
the Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation estimate
that casino gaming employment will increase by 69% in Nevada from 1994 to
2005).
121. See ROSE, supra note 11, at 1. According to Rose, legalized gambling in the
United States' history has progressed through three waves. See id. at 1-2. The
first wave began during the colonial period, when public lotteries helped to fi-
nance the new colonies. See id. Horse racing was also allowed as a holdover from
earlier times when "skills of war" matches were considered vital for military
preparedness. See id. at 70. Nelson argues the first wave ended to divert men's
attention to the war. See id. In contrast, the second wave began in the South for
the purpose of generating funds to pay for war losses. See id. at 1. That wave
ended in a series of scandals, the largest of which was the Louisiana Lottery
Scandal of the 1890s, in which private lottery owners attempted to buy the state
legislature. See id. Only after years of paying for Louisiana's folly, did the gam-
bling industry rise once again in 1964 with the New Hampshire sweepstakes.
See id. at 2. This was the beginning of the third wave which continues to thrive
in 1999.
122. See supra note 14.
123. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 586. But see Kindt, supra note 15.
124. See The Nat'l Indian Gaming Assoc., Where the Proceeds Go: Helping Indian Na-
tions Recover from Centuries of Economic and Social Neglect (visited Jan. 16,
1998) <http://www.dgsys.com/-niga/proceeds.html> (on file with the University of
Nebraska College of Law Library) ("Gaming holds some hope for reducing Indian
poverty, but is not a panacea.").
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change diminish the quality of life for some. Businesses that offer
competing products might suffer.12 5 This statement suggests other
possible repercussions of gambling and shopping, in addition to crime,
which is the externality most often studied in the gambling context.
We wili now discuss these undesirable spillovers and argue they are
so similar for the two activities that to proffer regulation of gambling
necessitates support for regulation of shopping.
Adverse and arguably unintended consequences result from both
gambling and shopping. Not only are the compulsive members of each
group harmful to themselves,' 2 6 but their actions are also cumber-
some to their families, communities and the aggregate society. Be-
cause both excessive shopping and gambling affect more than just the
compulsive buyer and pathological gambler, their actions are said to
produce negative externalities. Therefore, the argument for regula-
tion of each industry can be made by addressing their respective unde-
sirable spillovers.
Consumer debt is one of the most often cited consequence of insati-
able consumer desires because of its quantifiability. Estimates re-
garding consumer debt vary, but all conclude it is on the rise, totaling
$1.23 trillion as of February 1998,127 up almost forty percent over the
125. See William R. Eadington, Contributions of Casino-Style Gambling to Local Econ-
omies, 556 ANNALS Ai . ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 53, 56 (1998) (arguing that much
of the literature regarding the social benefits of gambling has ignored its non-
monetary value to consumers of the service, and offering a methodology to ana-
lyze the difficult-to-quantify benefit-consumption of an intangible good).
126. This side effect of gambling and shopping does not give much credence to regula-
tion in economic ideology because it impinges upon the idea of individual freedom
so fundamental to our culture and the discipline. In economic jargon, the con-
sumer, Homo Economicus, is assumed to be rational. He evaluates each of his
intended actions, assessing their marginal benefits and costs, and only engages in
those, which make him better off. But see Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card
Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AWx. BANKR. L.J. 249, 261
(1997) (proposing that rational consumers can spend beyond their means and
leave themselves in financial peril because they "systematically underestimate
the extent of their current and future credit card borrowing and, using these un-
derestimates, make suboptimal decisions regarding the choice and usage of credit
cards") (footnote omitted). In neoclassical economics, preferences are assumed to
be logical and are, therefore, largely ignored. Because of this presumption, the
economic rationale for regulation does not deal with the gambler's or shopper's
choice to engage in the respective activity or whether or not it is the best choice to
make. It is only when the choice made by the gambler/shopper affects others,
producing an externality (market failure), that neoclassical economic thought is
evoked in favor of market intervention.
127. See Frances B. Smith, Are Consumers Sinking in a Sea of Debt?, CoNsUmPs'
RES. MAG., Feb. 1998, at 10, 10. Smith argues that alarms sounding over con-
sumers' increasing levels of debt are unfounded and inadequate for governmental
intervention regarding credit decisions.
Unconsidered calls for action, such as [the Consumer Federation of
America's] exhortation for lenders to limit families' credit card lines to
20% of a households income and their cries that lower-income people are
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last five years alone.' 28 Similarly, figures regarding credit card debt
vary from an average of "four cards and roughly $4000 in high-interest
debt,"129 to seven cards with more than $2000 on each.130 Of course,
these credit card statistics could be the result of changes in the ways
consumers use credit cards.13' However, the data on consumer debt
cannot be so easily rebutted.
The culmination of excessive consumer debt resulting from shop-
ping negatively impacts more than just the individual shopper's bank
account. Bankruptcies in 1997 were estimated to have left lenders
with $40 million in bad debt.i 32 These lenders include credit card
over-using credit cards, often are seized upon by opportunistic policy
makers [sic]. Alarmist headlines and anecdotal scare stories about
credit card debt may trigger legislative or regulatory action that could
endanger the free flow of information that led to the democratization of
credit.
Id. at 13. Smith's argument is persuasive in so far as she fears regulation of
consumer credit because of increasing amounts of consumer debt. But would
such regulation really be unfounded? As I argue, economic reasoning for regula-
tion is founded when the decisions of one consumer affect the well being of an-
other, resulting in a negative externality. For a discussion of how the aggregate
of consumer debt could affect all consumers, see supra Part IV.2C.
128. See A Statistical Look at Consumer Debt, USA TODAY (visited Apr. 21, 1998)
<httpJ/www.usatoday.com/money/consumer/budget/mdebt005.htm> (on file with
the University of Nebraska College of Law Library) (noting that consumer debt is
now over $1 trillion); see also William Pesek Jr., As Household Debt Keeps Soar-
ing, So Do the Dangers for the Economy-and Stocks, BARRoN's, Dec. 22, 1997, at
MW15 (reporting that in 1997, consumers racked up over $1.2 trillion in install-
ment debt, which represents an increase of 50% from four years earlier).
129. Pesek, supra note 128, at MW15.
130. See Deck the Halls With Consumer Debt (last modified Dec. 23, 1996) <http'/
www.essential.org/hightower/1996/ht961223.html> (on file with the University of
Nebraska College of Law Library).
131. See Smith, supra note 127, at 11. Smith notes:
[pleople use credit cards differently today than they did 10 or 20 years
ago. Some people who in the 1970s would have had to take out a small
loan to purchase furniture or appliances are now using their credit cards
instead for an instant loan,'. . . . Many consumers use credit cards for
convenience ....
Id. Yet, Smith's argument does not address the issue of consumers increasingly
living beyond their means. Maybe consumers do use credit cards in place of
loans, but the point is consumer debt is rising to untold levels every year. See
Ausubel, supra note 125, at 270. Ausubel further reports that:
[r]evolving credit is now the single largest component of United States
outstanding consumer credit, totaling $435.7 billion at year-end 1995.
By contrast, at the same year-end, automobile loans totaled $354.1 bil-
lion and other consumer loans-such as personal loans, mobile home
loans and education loans-totaled $342.2 billion.
Id. at 254 (footnotes omitted).
132. See Consumer Debt in America (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1997) (tran-
script on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library); see also
Pesek, supra note 128, at MW15 (reporting that late payments for the third quar-
ter of 1997 were 5.31%, up from 5.03% in the third quarter of 1996); Susan Reda,
Consumer Bankruptcy, SToREs, Sept. 1997, at 20, 20 (reporting on statistics from
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companies, such as Visa and MasterCard; department stores that offer
their own credit cards, such as J.C. Penney and Dillards; and banks,
such as Huntington and Bank One. These companies will be forced to
recoup this lost profit. One way they will do this is by passing the loss
onto the consumer. Therefore, interest rates charged by credit card
companies will increase, interest rates offered by banks will decrease,
and inflation will result from firms raising prices. Of course, these
occurrences cannot be explained this simplistically. 33 However, in-
creasing amounts of bankruptcies and delinquencies are certainly
causal factors of inflation and interest rates.
In addition to the adverse economic impact of consumer debt, loan
delinquencies, and bankruptcy, crime is also a social cost of shopping.
Malls present criminals with a prime opportunity for theft. Shoppers
are likely to carry larger sums of money and more credit cards while
shopping. Furthermore, upon exiting malls, consumers are likely to
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts that the number of personal bank-
ruptcies hit an all-time high of 321,242 in the first quarter of 1997). Additionally,
Reda reports that approximately one of every 94 consumers filed for personal
bankruptcy in 1996, and this number is expected to continue to escalate. See id;
see also id. at 21 (discussing the causes of the rise in bankruptcies, one of which is
the destigmatizing of personal bankruptcy). Reda attributes this destigmatizing
of bankruptcy to "the media routinely reporting the financial perils of celebrities,
and debtor advocate lawyers boldly advertising bankruptcy as a means of debt
consolidation," and, as a result, "the social mores that once made bankruptcy a
shameful last resort have crumbled." Id. However, notwithstanding social per-
ceptions, the financial wound of filing for bankruptcy still takes time to heal.
Lenders still have an antipathy towards persons who have filed for bankruptcy,
and with the prospering economy, lenders can afford to discriminate when choos-
ing borrowers.
133. Inflation has numerous causes, inter alia, restrictions in supply or excess expend-
itures in the economy. See DAVID C. COLANDER, MACROECONOMWCS 177 (3rd ed.,
1998). Consequently, intense competition within an industry is thought to keep
prices low. But see Ausubel, supra note 126, at 261 ("The economic puzzle sur-
rounding the credit card market of the 1980s was why competition among the
more than four thousand card-issuing banks did not lead credit card interest
rates to follow decreases in the cost of funds.") (footnote omitted). Ausubel ex-
plains this phenomenon by arguing credit card users can be divided into two
classes: consumers who intend to borrow at the onset of obtaining a card and will
repay, and those consumers who intend to borrow but have less than sufficient
means to repay and thus will shop around for lower interest rates. See id. at 262
(quoting Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card
Market, Am. EcoN. REv., March 1991, at 50, reprinted in ADvANCEs iN BEHAv-
ioRAL FINANCE 527-82 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993)). From a lender's point of
view, the former class are the more desirable customers because they are less
likely to default. Additionally, these are also the consumers who have the more
inelastic demand, i.e., they are not very responsive to an increase in interest
rates of cards. Thus, "[gliven this environment of consumers, banks will be hesi-
tant to compete in the interest rate dimension, as a lower price on credit would




be carrying purchased goods with them that cannot be traced to the
thief upon seizure.
One survey conducted by the American's Research Group of
Charleston, South Carolina, found fear of crime has resulted in more
than thirty-three percent of consumers changing their shopping pat-
terns.13 4 Another study conducted in 1996 by Roper Starch World-
wide, the American's Research Group, and Management Horizons,
discovered that, compared to 1990, twenty percent fewer shoppers
make purchases at night.135 These polls have also found that about
one-third of shoppers have discontinued shopping in malls that they
perceive to be unsafe.136
Although criminal activity in and around malls has been given rel-
atively little scholarly attention, its existence is well-documented
within popular culture137 and retail literature. 3 8 This obliviousness
by the academic community, aside from the professional marketing(
134. See Fear of Crime Has Some Altering Shopping Habits, JET, May 16, 1994, at 40,
40 [hereinafter Fear] (surveying a random sample of 1003 Americans, 43% of
whom said they no longer shop after dark, 15% now shop with someone else, 50%
expressed concerned about getting to their cars safely, and 28% carry some form
of personal security, such as mace). It is important to note that there can be
significant differences between perceptions and reality. For example, such differ-
ences are illustrated in one study on the link between gambling and crime. See
generally Patricia A. Stokowski, Crime Patterns and Gaming Development in Ru-
ral Colorado, J. TRAVEL RES., Winter 1996, at 63, 68-69 (conducting interviews
with residents of three Colorado towns and finding that their perceptions of crime
after casinos were established were significantly higher than the actual statisti-
cal increases).
135. See Richard Halverson, Crime Steals Shoppers' Confidence, DiscouNT STORE
NEws, May 6, 1996, at 70 & 72 (noting that the two largest groups of consumers
who have discontinued shopping after dark are women and people over 60 years
of age; 12% of women and 17% of people over 60 stated they have stopped shop-
ping after dark).
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Fear, supra note 134.
138. See generally Always Vigilant: Security Shifts to Strips, CHAIN STORE AGE, Apr.
1997, at 100 (discussing the contemporary methods to reduce crime at shopping
centers, such as surveillance cameras and increased numbers of security guards
possessing chemical deterrents); Teresa Anderson et al., Minimizing Mall May-
hem, SECURITY Mairr., Nov. 1994, at 20 (discussing the security system installed
by Huntington Beach Mall in response to mounting concerns of patrons over the
possibility of victimization); James V. Fernando, Safety Management in Modern
Shopping Centers, PROFESSIONAL SAFETY, Jan. 1995, at 35 (detailing how archi-
tects can design malls to be less accessible to criminals and criminal activity);
Brian R. Johnson & Greg L. Warchol, Giving Security Space at the Mall, SECUR-
ITY MGMT., June 1997, at 87 (discussing ways malls can minimize liability in con-
sumer victimization cases); Keeping Centers Safe: Managing Security Needs,
CHAIN STORE AGE ExEcuTIvE, Apr. 1995, at AM15 (discussing how the media and
non-store retail formats have been exploiting the increasing crime in and around
shopping malls and suggesting ways in which shopping center managers can
fight back); Darren Maloney, Legal Field May be Leveled for Shopping Center
Owners, CHAIN STORE AGE, May 1997, at 98 (discussing a case then pending
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sales community, could be the result of consumption, unlike gambling,
not being deemed a vice, and consequently, not attracting scholarly
inquiry.
In fairness to both industries, however, it is important to note eco-
nomic growth strategies that result in economic development, whether
they are in the form of malls or casinos, are likely to experience in-
creases in crime because of the increase in tourism. Studies of com-
munities where gambling has been established indicate crime rates
have increased upon the introduction of gaming.1 39 So, are these in-
creases in crime where casinos are located caused by the increase in
visitors or the presence of gaming?140
According to Patricia A. Stokowski, there are five primary explana-
tions that could account for increases in crime statistics in gaming
towns. 14 1 These explanations are: 1) increases in tourism; 2) more
before the Supreme Court regarding mall owners' liability in cases such as
Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets).
139. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
140. But see supra note 48 and accompanying text. Yet, what Grinols and Omorov did
not report is that Las Vegas, the leading casino capital of the country, ranked
82nd, 80th, and 80th, respectively, on the 1990, 1991, and 1992 Uniform Crime
Reports compiled by the FBI. See Judiciary Hearing, supra note 16, at 438. The
crimes reported include "violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson)."
Id. at 426 (prepared statement of Jeremy D. Margolis, Former Asst. U.S. Attor-
ney and Dir. Illinois State Police). According to these reports, Orlando, Florida
(ranked 26th) was considerably ahead of Las Vegas in the 1990 report. See id. at
436. This contradiction is just one illustration of the ambiguous data presented
in the Grinols and Omorov article. For a more in-depth criticism of this article,
see William R. Eadington, Calling the Bluff. Analyzing the Legalization of Ca-
sino-Style Gaming: A Comment on "Bluff or Winning Hand? Riverboat Gambling
and Regional Employment and Unemployment," in Judiciary Hearing, supra note
16, at 462.
141. See Stokowski, supra note 134, at 64 (citing Jay S. Albanese, The Effect of Casino
Gambling on Crime, FED. PROBATION, June 1985, at 39,41; W.S. Roehl, Gambling
as a Tourist Attraction: Trends and Issues for the 21st Century, in ToRumsM: THE
STATE OF THE ART 156 (A.V. Seaton ed., 1994)). Stokowski compared crime rates
in three Colorado towns: Black Hawk, Central City and Cripple Creek. See id. at
63. All three towns introduced gaming in 1991. See id. Stokowski compared
crime statistics prior, during and after gambling establishment were opened. See
id. at 64. She found that crime increased in all three towns when casinos began
operation. See id. at 66. The largest increase was in property crimes such as
burglary, larceny-theft, and car theft. See id. However, this data is misleading,
as are many crime statistics, because the statistical calculations are based on the
permanent population. For example, despite the increase in the actual number of
crimes, in all three towns a citizen's chance of being victimized actually decreased
because the tourist population increased faster than the number of crimes. See
id. at 68. Furthermore, preliminary data available for the after assessment sug-
gested that crime in all three locations and all categories was on a downward
progress. See id. at 66; see also Judiciary Hearing, supra note 16, at 438 (pre-
pared statement of Jeremy D. Margolis, Former Asst. U.S. Attorney and Dir. Illi-
nois State Police) (reporting on the Uniform Crime Report rankings by city for
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law enforcement staff; 3) increases in the number of at-risk properties;
4) the flow of larger amounts of money; and 5) more opportunities for
crime. 142 After analyzing her data, Stokowski concluded it was not
evident whether gaming or tourism was the cause. 14 3
Upon reviewing extensive amounts of literature on the supposed
link between crime and gambling, we do not find this conclusion sur-
prising. Determining what causes the crime increases resulting from
both gambling and shopping is not easy because the causes them-
selves are not that simplistic. It is likely that the number of tourists
does affect crime rates. Additionally, communities usually hire more
law enforcement personnel to accommodate the increase. As Stokow-
ski argues, more police also means more rigorous or exact crime re-
porting, as stronger standards are likely to be enforced with larger
police staffs.1 44 Moreover, since many of the new officers are drawn
from outside the community, not from the residential population, and
many have been trained in larger metropolitan areas, their methods of
operation are more professional (objective) than once was common. 14 5
These assertions were confirmed by her interviews with residents of
some Colorado towns who complained the new officers had little re-
spect for old-timers and failed to uphold the flexible law enforcement
standards enjoyed in pre-gaming times. 14 6
William J. Miller and Martin D. Schwartz, professors of sociology
at Ohio University, suggest another cause for crime escalation:
[Olne of the reasons why there is more crime in tourist areas is that tourists
themselves are the targets for crime .... Mourists who leave cameras on
the City of Las Vegas from the years, 1979-1991). In 1979, Las Vegas ranked
first among U.S. cities in Part I Crimes per 100,000 population. With each year
passing during this time span, Las Vegas slipped farther down in ranking. See
id. In 1991, Las Vegas was 80th, behind such cities as Orlando, Florida; Sacra-
mento, California; and Toledo, Ohio. See id. at 436. This data suggests that once
communities have had time to adjust to and accommodate the increase in tour-
ism, crime rates decline significantly.
142. See Stokowski supra note 134, at 64.
143. See id. at 68.
144. See id. at 67.
145. See id. Please note that I am aware that these additions to the local payroll and,
similarly, incarceration and court fees associated with prosecuting apprehended
criminals represent a financial burden to the local gaming community. I, how-
ever, was unable to locate convincing data on estimations of these costs and fur-
thermore, it is questionable whether or not the citizens of the community are
even responsible for these costs. To the extent that the costs exceed the tax reve-
nues generated by the casinos, it is likely local citizens might have to bear these
costs. However, community officials have the authority to increase gaming taxa-
tion levels to compensate for the excess. Moreover, these costs are also associated
with crime in and around malls. Criminals apprehended prowling in mall terri-
tory also must be incarcerated and prosecuted. Therefore, these additional social
costs are not convincing as a factor distinguishing between gambling and shop-
ping, which would argue for regulation of gaming and not consumption.
146. See id.
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beach towels while swimming are more likely to be theft victims; tourists who
are out carousing and heavily drinking in the early hours in dangerous neigh-
borhoods are more likely to be robbed or raped; and tourists who leave expen-
sive valuables in anonymous and loosely guarded hotel and motel rooms are
more likely to be the victims of burglary.1 4 7
Besides the proliferation of criminal activity, two other negative
externalities result from both gambling and shopping. The first is the
traffic congestion that results from the increase in tourism. Conceiva-
bly, areas most desperate for economic development are usually those
areas most ill-equipped for the increase. Browne and Kubasek discuss
this consequence and suggest that better planning prior to the intro-
duction of casinos (and malls) could alleviate the costs associated with
accommodating the increase in community visitation.148
The other and final outcome1 49 of both gambling and shopping is
the cannibalization of existing businesses. Malls have been known to
147. William J. Miller & Martin D. Schwartz, Casino Gambling and Street Crime, 556
ANNALs Ai. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 124, 127 (1998).
148. See Browne & Kubasek, supra note 22, at 11-12 (noting that infrastructure costs
incurred by Atlantic City included "new sewer lines, more police service, and fre-
quent street repair and maintenance").
149. The reader questions why I chose not to include a discussion of organized crime
within the gambling industry or a more in-depth discussion of the social costs
associated with compulsive gambling. I have two reasons for excluding a discus-
sion on organized crime. First, the continued perception of gambling as a social
vice by some affluent and raucous members and groups in society distinguishes it
from the socially acceptable activity of consumption. If organized crime within
the gambling realm does exist, its goal is probably to expand the legalization of
gambling. It is not absurd to imagine that if shopping were also widely recog-
nized as a social ill, organized crime would develop within this arena also. Hence,
I exclude a discussion of organized crime because I found no compelling evidence
that it even exists. Furthermore, I doubt whether any would exist if legalization
were not so cumbersome in this society for private firms. For an example of an
anti-consumption movement, which would argue that consumption/shopping is
indeed a vice, see Affiuenza (visited Sept. 25, 1997) <http'J/www.econet.org/bull-
frogfaffl.html> (on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
Affluenza is defined as: "1. The bloated, sluggish and unfulfilled feeling that re-
sults from one's efforts to keep up with the Joneses; 2. An epidemic of stress,
overwork, shopping and debt caused by dogged pursuit of the American Dream; 3.
An unsustainable addiction to economic growth; 4. A film that could change your
life." Id. The final definition is in reference to a television program with the
same title. See Affluenza (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 15, 1997). Second, I
did not include a more in-depth discussion of the negative externalities associ-
ated with gambling because essentially they are the same as those for compulsive
shopping. Both types of persons can incur substantial amounts of debt and the
consequences of doing so are detailed in the section regarding the ills of shopping.
There are also social costs in the form of public spending on resources for compul-
sive gamblers, but the same is also true about consumption. Agencies such as
Consumer Credit Counseling Service, Genus Credit Management, and American
Consumer Credit Counseling exist to help those who find themselves in financial
peril. Interestingly, casinos and retailers themselves fund many of these organi-
zations. Notice, however, the personal distress experienced by both compulsive
shoppers and pathological gamblers is not discussed within this context because
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leave existing downtown shopping areas desolate. Similarly, casinos
attract recreational patrons who might have vacationed or visited
elsewhere and casinos usually offer cheap buffet meals. This outcome,
however, is not persuasive for purposes of arguing for regulation of
gambling and not shopping for two reasons. First, as mentioned
before, malls also cannibalize businesses. Second, economic reasoning
explains cannibalization as simply a shift in consumer preferences.
The microeconomic argument that consumers know best how to allo-
cate their dollars has some merit in the case of a casino. For occa-
sional gamblers, the shift from any previous consumption item to
gambling is no different from shifting their preferences from movie-
going to dinner in a restaurant.150 Of course, this shift is not so facile
if employees within one industry do not possess the skills necessary
for employment in the feasting, new business. Yet it is arguable that
recreational and retail employees have similar talents, as do waiters
or waitresses in any restaurant, and thus the transition between busi-
nesses should be smoother.
Communities where casino gambling is well established, such as
Las Vegas, have experienced lucrative economic prosperity. Further-
more, Las Vegas' crime rates are well below those for numerous other
tourist cities.15 1 Seemingly, there are preparations and actions com-
munities can take to make legalization of gaming a promising source
of economic development.
The economic case for regulating casino gaming is not currently
persuasive. The analogy with shopping demonstrates the strength of
the libertarian argument on economic grounds for allowing casino
gaming to continue under its current regulatory regime.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Ethical Dimensions of Casino Gaming
We suggest in this final section that certain ethical dimensions of
casino gaming should be the focus of regulatory discussions. When we
consider who we are, we certainly would hope to include as part of the
portrait a sense of caring. But just what would we mean by this as-
pirational characterization? What does it mean to care? About whom
should we care?
The regulatory background is shaped by a struggle among loyalists
to one or another approach to allocation of resources. For many rea-
sons, both substantive and symbolic, markets are elevated by some
it is not a negative externality nor any other market failure that would necessi-
tate governmental regulation.
150. See Richard Gazel, The Economic Impacts of Casino Gambling at the State and
Local Levels, 556 ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 66, 78-79 (1998).
151. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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and reviled by others as the preferred conflict resolution mechanism.
Mavens of markets see the profit motive as a wondrously smooth, effi-
cient avenue for achieving social welfare. On the other hand, those
distrustful of markets recall their putative role in encouraging soil
erosion, unsafe products, and destruction of the rainforest, and are
immediately skeptical of market responses to human dilemmas.
In general, what are the attributes of a human problem that nes-
tles comfortably in the market realm? Asking this question has a con-
fused quality to it in our culture. The allocation and distribution of all
material goods and services are simply presumed to be market respon-
sibilities in our context unless someone can demonstrate the contrary.
The burden of proof is on those who would urge limits on market
choices. Markets appear to maximize personal freedom, especially if
we do not look too deeply into more positive forms of liberty, many of
which are represented by capabilities that require monetary re-
sources. For instance, a tiger farm in India is not a relevant vacation
site for an animal lover who, while possessing the legal right to travel
there, lacks the income and wealth to finance the use of that particu-
lar market opportunity.
Fundamentally, market choices by both buyer and seller are con-
sistent with a worldview dominated by individualism. Suppose that
the major determinant of our condition in life is the congeries of
choices we make. These choices have outcomes that are deserved be-
cause we are presumed to make them as reflective calculators, aware
of our objectives and cognizant of both the identity and ramifications
of relevant options. Then it would seem to follow that we should pre-
sume the aptness of markets, that decision-making framework that
permits us, as individuals, to act on personal preferences. Pari passu,
the community's preferences will be fulfilled in certain regards in cer-
tain institutional arrangements. What results is a private sphere, a
domain where goods and services are bought and sold in an optimal
fashion.
Yet, even the most vigorous market romance is limited by the reali-
zation that at times the presumption on behalf of markets can be over-
come. For instance, we would be jarred to see a shop in a strip mall
urging us to avail ourselves of the current sale on "friendship." But
why? Why are certain dimensions of the human experience regarded
as forbidden exchanges? What happened to the dominant rhetoric
about freedom of contract in such situations? What are the parame-
ters of the public sphere?
The pervasiveness of individualism elevates the individual's inter-
ests over those of the collective. 1 52 The result is a cultural53 habit of
152. See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND CoinmirimnT IN AxEaicAN LiFE (1987) (stating that individualism is a funda-
mental belief of those with an atomistic view of human nature; it holds that each
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mind that sees personal needs as preeminent and social needs as sec-
ondary.15 4 Individualists downplay their ties to others, viewing them-
selves as essentially atomistic.SS Consequently, individualism holds
that "each individual is the controlling factor in shaping personal
destiny."'5 6 This perception of reality leads to their valuing self-reli-
ance, freedom from regulation (negative liberty),15 7 rationality, 5 8 and
personal choice.
A community from this perspective is an aggregation of egos. So-
cial wisdom emerges from the nurturing of the virtues associated with
the individualistic worldview. To speak of a community as an organic
endeavor is, from this perspective, a confusion. Hence, language of
unification and communal responsibility such as claims that it takes a
individual is the controlling factor, through his or her choices, in shaping per-
sonal outcomes and that personal responsibility is both the prescription and de-
scription for human behavior).
153. Culture is implicit in the expectations and judgments of participants. Harry C.
Triandis offers the following useful definition of its source and power:
Culture emerges in interaction. As people interact, some of their ways of
thinking, feeling, and behaving are transmitted to each other and be-
come automatic ways of reacting to specific situations. The shared be-
liefs, attitudes, norms, roles, and behaviors are aspects of culture....
Culture is to society what memory is to individuals. It includes
things that have "worked" in the past.
HARRY C. TRIANDiS, INDMDUALISM & COLLECTmSM 4 (1995).
154. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBAITH, THE AFFLUENT SocrETY 190-204 (4th ed.
1984). Galbraith discusses what he calls social imbalance and the immersion in
private lavishness in the midst of social squalor. His point is that absorption
with individual preferences and their fulfillment in markets establishes a quite
understandable fascination with the fulfillment of certain kinds of needs. For
purposes of our argument, the fact that neither children nor endangered species
are either owned or permitted to be commodities suggests an awareness that
there is something more than individual valuation at work in designing the pa-
rameters of politics.
155. Atomism assumes that the makeup of the individual is given independently from
society. It "postulates independent disembodied entities volitionally charting
their own paths in pursuit of personal well-being." Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et
al., Advancing the Rights of Poor and Working-Class Women in an Individualistic
Culture, 2 Loy. POVERTY L.J. 41, 41 n.2 (1996) (holding that the only purpose of
society is to benefit the individual, atomism places a high value on negative lib-
erty (the absence of government interference in the lives of its citizens). Atomis-
tic psychology had a strong influence on the development of classical liberal
thought. See E.K. HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS: THE EVOLUTION OF EcONOMIc
INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS 39-40 (7th ed., 1995). This influence remains evident in
the market-oriented thought of neoclassical economists today.
156. Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 155, at 42 n.3.
157. See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 152, at 23 ("Freedom is perhaps the most resonant,
deeply held American value.... To Americans, freedom is often defined as the
freedom from an oppressive authority and from having others' views and lifes-
tyles forced upon them.... [However, w]hat it is that one might do with that
freedom is much more difficult for Americans to define.").
158. See id. at 148-49 (discussing middle class individualism and its emphasis on ra-
tionality and success).
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whole village to accomplish a goal is seen as misguided in that it de-
tracts from personal responsibility and thereby weakens social
character.
Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first scholars to label such
thought patterns as "individualism." In Democracy in America, he
wrote,
Individualism is a novel expression, to which a novel idea has given birth.
Our fathers were only acquainted with egotism. Egotism is a passionate and
exaggerated love of self which, leads a man to connect everything with his own
person, and to prefer himself to everything in the world. Individualism is a
mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to
sever himself from the mass of his fellow-creatures; and to draw apart with
his family and friends; so that, after he formed a little circle of his own, he
willingly leaves the society at large to itself. Egotism originates in blind in-
stinct: individualism proceeds from erroneous judgment more than from de-
praved feelings; it originates as much in the deficiencies of the mind as in the
perversity of the heart. Egotism blights the germ of all virtue; individualism,
at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but, in the long run, it attacks and
destroys all others, and is at length absorbed in downright egotism. Egotism
is a vice as old as the world, which does belong to one form of society more
than another: individualism is of democratic origin, and threatens to spread in
the same ratio as the equality of conditions. 15 9
The United States that Tocqueville analyzed almost two centuries
ago is today the primary site where individualistic thought flour-
ishes.' 6 0 Evidence of individualism's strength in the United States
includes its reliance on a market-driven economy,'61 and its dominant
form of religion.' 6 2
The link between individualism and markets is especially impor-
tant for thinking about casino gaming because casinos see themselves
as just another service like a bakery or a laundry, in business to meet
a need of others. This stance is at its core an ethical perspective. It
makes claims to advance the efficiency, comfort, and stability of the
community. From this perspective, markets offer private pleasure
that is threatened by democratic political judgments and the statutes
they encourage. In that regard, markets are the venue in which the
fruits of personal responsibility can be rewarded.
But the condition of the community is everyone's concern, and as
such lacks value in a domain that responds to personal preferences
159. ALEXIS DETocQEv , DEmORACY IN AMERICA 366 (Henry Reeve trans., Henry
Steele Commanger ed., World Classics ed., 1946) (1835).
160. See, e.g., George C. Lodge, Introduction to IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL ComPEnITIvE-
NESS: AN ANALYSIS OF NINE CouNTrS 10 (George C. Lodge & Ezra F. Vogel eds.,
1987).
161. See HuNT, supra note 155, at 38-45, for a discussion of the individualistic as-
sumptions and attitudes that encouraged the development of a market culture.
162. See GERRY C. HEARD, BASIc VALUES AND ETIcAL DECISIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF
INDrvDUALISm AND CorNTrrY IN APiEicAN SocIr 5 (1990) (viewing American
religious individualism as being closely related to the Protestantism that is domi-
nant in the United States).
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only. Hence, those who wish to protect the virtues of an endangered
community look to political discourse as their best chance to activate
their priorities.
Contrary to individualistic thought, communitarianism or any
form of political activity that elevates the needs of the collective above
the needs of the individual recognizes the need for a separate sphere
of activities delimited by their joint preference and consumption. 16 3
Collectivists frequently define their well-being in terms of the group's
well-being. Rather than emphasize individual rights, as individual-
ists do, collectivists view their duties to the group as paramount. They
value interdependence and close relationships.164
Because collectivists tend to see themselves as interconnected with
other members of their society, they are more likely to implement eco-
nomic policies that rely on forces other than the supply and demand.
Hence, they would view gaming in terms of its impact on dominant
community values. This method of discussion is not a substitute for
economic arguments, but as along as we see ourselves as a community
that stands for certain ethical principles, those principles deserve to
be a major component in the public discussion of the regulation of ca-
sino gaming.
163. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., AmmITA ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES
AND THE Co1muNITARiAN AGENDA 1-14 (1993).
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